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I. INTRODUCTION
What should the Supreme Court of the United States do when a plaintiff tries to sue a defendant under a federal statute that provides no private
remedy for damages? This is the question at the heart of all cases dealing
with so-called implied rights of action. This Comment addresses the topic
of implied cause of action. The term “implied cause of action” does not
have a clear meaning, but generally refers to a federal cause of action based
1
2
on a federal statute that does not expressly provide for a remedy. When
the Supreme Court implies a cause of action into a federal statute, the Court

1
This Comment will not discuss in detail implication cases based on the Constitution. This is
because the Supreme Court is generally more willing to find an implied cause of action under the Constitution than under a statute because constitutional implication tends to protect more fully constitutional
rights than statutory implication can protect statutory rights. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action
for violations of the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-44 (1979) (holding an
implied cause of action for violations of the Fifth Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-21
(1980) (holding an implied cause of action under the Eighth Amendment).
2
This is a paraphrase of Justice Powell’s definition: “the right of a private party to seek judicial
relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement. In the context of legislation
enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory duty.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979). This Comment makes use of both the terms “implied cause of action” and
“implication” to mean this situation.
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3

treats that action as if it were a literal provision of the statute. The question
of jurisdiction to hear an implied cause of action case, however, is outside
4
the scope of this Comment.
5
The starting place is the leading Supreme Court case of Cort v. Ash,
when the Supreme Court first defined a four-factor approach to implied
causes of action. In doing so, it is important to know a brief history of implication. Each of the four factors will be discussed to understand what they
mean. In addition, leading cases that changed this analysis will be analyzed.
The four factors will then be examined as they currently stand in varying
degrees of importance.
This Comment will next address two of the leading schools of interpretation on implication cases. One approach is that of Justice Scalia, who
argues that the Court should rarely, if ever, use congressional intent in interpreting whether to imply a cause of action. On the other side of the issue
are the contextualists who argue that even actual congressional intent is
unnecessary if Supreme Court doctrines at the time of the creation of the
statute often implied causes of action. Finding neither approach practical or
acceptable, this Comment offers a third option: that the Supreme Court
should imply causes of action only when Congress actually considered the

3
David L. Heinemann, Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 567-68 (1986). This also means that all defenses and requirements to
reach federal court that the Court traditionally would grant under express causes of action also exist
when the Court implies a private right of action. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 639 (1988) (granting
an in pari delicto defense for implied securities actions). See generally Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding that the implied cause of
action under federal patent law lacked merit and therefore the case did not “arise under” federal law).
4
Subject matter jurisdiction for an implied cause of action is derivative of whether the cause of
action is implied. If the court does imply a cause of action, then there necessarily is federal question
subject matter jurisdiction. If the court does not imply a cause of action, then there is no federal question
subject matter jurisdiction based on the statute. 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4004.3 (2d ed. 1987). There is some controversy, however, over
the constitutional appropriateness of this kind of bootstrapping of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the Weathered Jurisdictional Fences in the Supreme Court’s Securities
Fraud Decisions, 49 SMU L. REV. 159, 193-99 (1996) (“When a federal court creates a private right of
action for the violation of a federal statute, it engages in an unconstitutional expansion of its limited
subject-matter jurisdiction.”); John T. Cross, The Constitutional Federal Question in the Lower Courts
of the United States and Canada, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 156 (1993) (arguing that
“implying a cause of action from a statute undoubtedly involves a certain degree of judicial activism”
and that “federal courts in the United States . . . regularly take this analysis”). Part of the concern over
this dichotomy is that many enterprising litigants may attempt to argue for an implied cause of action
from a statute which addresses jurisdictional concerns. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754
(2004).
Additionally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on implied causes of action appears to extend just as far, and no further, than an expressed statutory right. Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff &
Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 (1987).
5
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
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issue when creating the statute. As additional support for the direction of
6
the Court towards implied causes of action, an appendix is provided.
II. CORT V. ASH AND THE FIRST IMPLICATION CASES
The Supreme Court’s approach to implied causes of action did not it7
self begin with the signal case of Cort v. Ash. Rather, that important decision synthesized several different approaches to implied causes of action
and created a singular test. Due to this, the landmark case of Cort is a focal
point of this Comment. What remained to be decided after Cort was not
how to imply causes of action, but what controlled in that determination.
A.

The Cort Decision

Cort involved the Bethlehem Steel Corporation allegedly violating a
8
criminal statute, which barred a corporation from using general corporate
funds to pay for political advertisements during the presidential campaign
9
of 1972. The Court wasted little time, however, on the question of whether
10
a criminal statute could result in civil remedies and remained fixed on the
more memorable question of whether a statute that did not explicitly create
11
a cause of action could create one implicitly.
A unanimous Court established a four-factor test based on old case law
12
to determine whether a private suit could be found under the statute:
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,” . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla6
See appendix, infra. For easier reference, the appendix of cases is listed in reverse chronological order. For purposes of simplification, concurring Justices who join the majority opinion are placed
under the heading of “majority” with a star by their name. This list consists of a brief and recent history
of implication cases since 1979.
The appendix is meant to be a list of cases since 1979 where the Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of whether a statute included an implied cause of action and is not meant to be an exhaustive list of
all cases involving implication in other respects. Hence, cases where the Court has extended implied
causes of action will be addressed in this Comment, but will not be listed in the appendix. E.g. Cent.
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis
& Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). As the appendix shows, the cases have shown a clear
trend towards less implication over the years.
7
Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
8
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
9
Cort, 422 U.S. at 70.
10 Id. at 79 (holding that “provision of a criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude implication of a private cause of action for damages”).
11 Id. at 68 (noting that “the principal issue presented for decision is whether a private cause of
action for damages against corporate directors is to be implied . . . .”).
12 Id. at 78.
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tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
13
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Going systematically, the Court noted that the plaintiff failed to meet
any of the factors. In examining the statute for rights, the Supreme Court
found that “there was nothing more than a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to any14
one.” Second, the Court pointed out that legislative history of Congress in
this case “demonstrated that the protection of ordinary stockholders was at
15
best a secondary concern.” The Court similarly found that the purposes of
the statute would not be served because “the remedy sought would not aid
the primary congressional goal” of preventing corporate influence in poli16
tics. Finally, the Court pointed out that state law already well regulated the
issue in question and that several potential causes of action and remedies
17
existed there. The Supreme Court therefore found that when the factors
were added together in this case, the statute did not lend itself to an implied
cause of action.
The Origins of Cort

B.

The phenomenon of the Court implying a cause of action has a long
18
19
history. Most scholars point out that the first case where the Court en20
gaged in an implication analysis was in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby
where the Court engaged in a form of negligence per se combined with a
determination of whether the injured party was of a class protected by the
13

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Cort, 422 U.S. at 80.
15 Id. at 81. As if to reiterate the point more clearly, the Court later exclaimed “there is no indication whatever in the legislative history of § 610 which suggests a congressional intention to vest in
corporate shareholders a federal right to damages for violation of § 610.” Id. at 82.
16 Id. at 84.
17 Id. (“In addition to the ultra vires action pressed here, the use of corporate funds in violation of
federal law may, under the law of some States, give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
18 Some argue that the Court had been implying causes of action from as far back as 1803, but
had been doing so under a rationale different from Cort. Susan Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent
in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 (1996); see
also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 67, 68 (2001) (arguing that courts until the 1970s always implied causes of action to remedy violations of a statutory right).
19 E.g., Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under §1983: The
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283,
291(1996); Bruce A. Boyer, Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the Ongoing Vitality
of Cort v. Ash, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 722, 733 (1985); Christopher L. Sagers, Note, An Implied Cause of
Action Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (1997).
20 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
14
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21

statute. This approach was highly similar to that of a state court employ22
ing general common law principles. It therefore came as little surprise that
the Court’s pre-Cort presumption was to imply causes of action. This became problematic when the Court began to do away with the idea of a gen23
eral federal common law. While the presumption in favor of implication
could no longer remain tethered to theories of negligence per se, the Court
24
would not adjust this presumption until Cort.
This beginning led the Court to avoid engaging in this issue until 1964
25
in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak. The allegation in Borak was that the J. I. Case
Company, in attempting to merge with another corporation, violated their
fiduciary duties to the shareholders and made misrepresentations when it
26
27
sent out its proxy solicitations to the shareholders. The Court, by examining Section 14(a) in conjunction with Section 27 of the statute in ques28
tion thought it “clear that private parties have a right under Section 27 to
29
bring suit for violation of Section 14(a) of the Act.” The Court added that
the statute, by allowing for a suit “brought to enforce any liability or
30
duty,” created enough of an implication for the statute to contain an im-

21 Id. at 39 (“A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover damages from the party in default is implied.”). Not all Supreme Court Justices have agreed that Rigsby
began implied causes of action, however. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting) (commenting that Rigsby followed traditional common law approach to the issue “and cannot be taken as
authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not legislated by Congress”).
22 E.g., Elder v. E. I. Due Pont de Nemours & Co., 479 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Ala. 1985); Crosby v.
Hummell, 63 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Alaska 2003); Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn., 114 Cal. App. 4th 208,
218 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003).
23 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff’s “argument in favor of implication of a private right of action
based on tort principles, therefore, is entirely misplaced”). But see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “I recognize that the Court’s disallowance . .
. of an action for misrepresentation of belief is entirely contrary to the modern law of torts . . . .”).
24 See generally J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a cause of action based on
different criteria).
25 Id.
26 A proxy solicitation is a solicitation sent out at the corporation’s expense for the shareholders to
vote on a matter deemed to be of corporate business. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 576-707 (2003) [hereinafter HAZEN &
MARKHAM]. Misrepresentation of proxy materials a violation of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C.S.
§ 78n(a) (1934).
27 Borak, 377 U.S. at 429-30.
28 The pertinent text of Section 27 is as follows:

The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder
. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1934).
29 Borak, 377 U.S. at 426-27.
30 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
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31

plied cause of action. The Supreme Court appeared to latch onto this
“duty” creating language. The Court thus began the debate on whether duties amounted to rights under the later Cort analysis.
After Borak, the Court began to imply causes of action quite fre32
quently. Cort therefore, became the seminal case not because it changed
the law of implied causes of action, but because it delineated the four factors that the Court implicitly relied on in determining whether to imply a
33
cause of action. Notably, the Court, while establishing the test that argua34
bly made implied causes of action far easier to find, did not find one in
this case.
C. The Cort Factors in Action
1.

First Factor: Rights Conferred to the Plaintiff by Statute

The first factor of Cort is whether the plaintiff is part of an especial
class who benefits from the statute and therefore creates a federal right. It is
35
not simply enough that the word “right” is in the statute. Additionally, the
36
idea of an “especially harmed” class does not automatically confer a right.

31

Borak, 377 U.S. at 427.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (finding an implied
cause of action under the Securities Act of 1934); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)
(finding an implied cause of action under the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
401 (1970) (finding an implied right of action in Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967);
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (finding an implied cause of action under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (finding an implied cause of
action under the Fourth Amendment); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of
Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 845 (2002) (“Between 1964 and 1975, the Supreme
Court in several cases found an implied private cause of action under various regulatory statutes.”). But
see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (declining to find an implied cause of action after thorough examination of legislative intent).
33 E.g., Charity Scott, A Broker-Dealer’s Civil Liability to Investors for Fraud: An Implied Private
Right of Action Under Section 15(C)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 IND. L.J. 687, 701
(1988); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in
the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987); Boyer, supra note 19, at 734. But see Key, supra note
19, at 295 (noting that commentators disagree as to whether Cort represented a departure from previous
decisions); Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies,
and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1074 (1992).
34 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 32, at 845 (“Although the Supreme Court probably intended Cort's
four-part test to limit judicial implication of private rights of action, in the four years after Cort, twenty
federal appellate decisions implied private actions from federal statutes.”).
35 Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (“In expounding a statute,
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.”) (internal quotes omitted).
36 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981) (“[S]uch a definition of ‘especial’ beneficiary makes this factor meaningless. Under this view, a victim of any crime would be deemed an especial
beneficiary of the criminal statute’s proscription. Cort did not adopt such a broad-gauge approach.”).
32
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37

To some extent, this became a threshold issue. In fact, the Court, in
Cort v. Ash itself noted specifically that the plaintiff had failed to meet this
38
factor and therefore implication would likely be improper. This factor was
nothing new. The Supreme Court was merely relying on portions of doctrine already laid out in earlier decisions to support individuals whose statu39
tory rights were injured. In fact, this factor appears to be similar to state
40
common law approaches to negligence per se.
Some have pointed out that this factor effectively asks whether Congress has bestowed specific substantive rights on an identifiable class of
persons and whether supporting that right with a right to private suit is ap41
propriate. Justice Stevens, for one, views this factor to be a paramount
42
concern in the determination of whether a private cause of action exists.
Some have argued that this factor, combined with the second factor, has
43
been the Court’s best effort to find the ultimate legislative intent. The factor therefore changed from asking whether congressional intent existed to
bestow a plaintiff some statutorily granted right, to whether the statute
granted a right from which the Court could infer a congressional intent to
44
imply a cause of action.
A prime example of this factor at work is that of securities fraud
45
cases. Indeed, entire sections of casebooks have been devoted to the study

37 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002) (holding that “we must first determine
whether Congress intended to create a federal right”); Harvey R. Boller, Unlawful Treatment of the
Handicapped by Federal Contractors and an Implied Private Cause of Action: Shall Silence Reign?, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1301 (1982).
38 Cort, 422 U.S. at 79.
39 See Sagers, supra note 19, at 1395 (complaining that the first factor “is merely a restatement of
the Rigsby standard”). “In fact, for the first factor the Court directly cited Rigsby.” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78
(citing Rigsby).
40 For example, in Elder v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Alabama Supreme Court held
that negligence per se requires inter alia that “the trial judge must determine as a matter of law that the
statute was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the litigant seeking to assert the [state]
statute.” 479 So. 2d at 1248 (1985). This is highly similar to the Cort factor of asking whether the federal statute is one that benefits [or protects] a special class of citizens, including the litigant. Cort, 422
U.S. at 79.
41 Boyer, supra note 19, at 732.
42 See infra, note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value of rights analysis as
Justice Stevens understands it.
43 Stabile, supra note 18, at 867.
44 Scott, supra note 33, at 706.
45 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 171 (“This case concerns the most familiar private cause of action: one
we have found to be implied by § 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the [Securities and Exchange
Act].”). Scott, supra note 33, at 707 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that ‘[d]efrauded
investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities laws.’”). This,
however, does not mean that implied causes of action exist only in the field of securities law. See Universities Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Contu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (examining the question of whether a right
was conferred under the statute in determining whether a private right of action should be granted); see
also appendix.
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of implied causes of action within the area of securities laws. When the
Court sees language in the statute that seems to create private rights, the
47
implication of a private right of action appears to be more probable. When
the Supreme Court examines the statute, however, and finds that the statute
limits a wrong rather than creates a right, the Court will not generally imply
48
a cause of action. In addition, “the provision giving rise to the asserted
49
right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.”
Some have pointed out that the word “right” is one of the most am50
biguous words in the field of law. Some have argued that a right is the
51
result of a duty created by a statute. However, a right must be more than
that for purposes of implied causes of action. Instead, the language of the
statute must show intent to confer an actual right on the prospective plaintiff.
2.

Second Factor: Legislative Intent

The second factor of Cort—namely whether there is any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create a remedy or to deny one—
52
has been the subject of much controversy. The Supreme Court placed the
understanding of this factor under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
53
National Association of Railroad Passengers. This inquiry speculates that
if Congress had specifically legislated on whether a cause of action should
exist on this very matter, it would have granted one explicitly (or possibly
54
would have refused to do so). The original Cort approach therefore meant

46

HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 576-707.
Boller, supra note 37, at 1303.
48 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (“Statutes that focus on the person regulated
rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular
class of persons.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also Contu, 450 U.S. at 771 (holding that “there
would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons where Congress, rather
than drafting the legislation with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, instead has framed the
statute simply as a general prohibition or a command to a federal agency”) (internal quotes omitted); see
also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 92 (1981) (holding that the
statutes in question were directed against employers rather than creating rights for those employers).
49 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
50 Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and the Creation of
Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613, 628 (2003) (quoting 4 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence § 118, at
56 (1959)).
51 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
52 Before the Supreme Court gets to the question of congressional intent, however, it must first
find that Congress had a legitimate source of power to legislate. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 15.
53 Cort, 422 U.S. at 77 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 414 U.S. at 458-60).
54 Gebser v. Lago Vista, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). Obviously, the question is not whether Congress
would have legislated on the issue implicitly, since the entire inquiry of an implied cause of action
presupposes that Congress may have legislated on the matter implicitly.
47

128

248

FIU Law Review

[1:239

that an implied right of action could be found even in the absence of legisla55
tive intent to grant it.
This hypothetical inquiry itself admittedly does change some common
law presumptions in favor of implication, since the presumption must now
be that there is no implied cause of action unless the legislative intent helps
to establish otherwise while the old common law presumption was that a
56
cause of action existed unless Congress acted otherwise.
The question of legislative intent always begins with the language of
57
the statute. In most contested cases, however, the statute itself is silent.
This is only logical, of course, for if the language were clear on the issue
the case would not rest on an implication theory in the first place. If the
language of the statute does not result in clear finding of whether a cause of
action exists, the Court will examine the legislative record for other aspects
to determine legislative intent.
The Supreme Court has commented that one way to find this legisla58
tive intent is to look at the statute contextually. The Court will look at the
condition of the federal law on the subject at the time of the statute's passage to see what Congress would expect to happen when a private party
attempted to enforce the statute. Inside of this inquiry into legislative intent,
the Court has noted alternative remedies available to the plaintiff as relevant
59
to the question. If the plaintiff has other alternatives, the Court will usu60
ally assume that Congress did not intend to add a private suit to them.
3. Third Factor: Consistent with the Legislative Scheme
The third factor, whether an implied cause of action is “consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
61
for the plaintiff,” means that the Supreme Court will examine the purposes
of the statute and the remedies offered by Congress to determine if granting
62
private actions would support or hinder those purposes. The Court recently elaborated on this factor to point out that “[a] private remedy should

55 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1423 (2001) (arguing that although the Cort factors “included congressional intent, courts remained free
in theory to recognize an implied right of action even in the absence of legislative intent to grant one”).
56 Scott, supra note 33, at 711; see also Clark, supra note 55, at 1424 (“The result of the Court’s
current approach ‘has been to reverse the presumption of the earliest implication cases’ . . . .’”).
57 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979)
58 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
59 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
60 Id.
61 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
62 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 573 (resting in part on the fact that “[t]here is evidence to support the
view that [the statute] was intended to provide the exclusive remedy . . . ”). See generally Borak, 377
U.S. at 431 (holding that the purpose of the statute in question led to the view that “broad remedial
purposes” were to be included).
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not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative
scheme. On the other hand, when that remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly
63
receptive to its implication under the statute.”
One commentator views this factor as a policy determination by the
Court to determine whether providing a private remedy would be fair under
64
the statute. This would appear to make this issue a hybrid between general
policy determinations (which would encompass principles of common law
65
jurisprudence) and a pure examination of congressional intent. As such,
the Court’s determination of purpose appears to begin and end at an analy66
sis of remedies provided by the statute.
4. Fourth Factor: State Law
The fourth factor of Cort v. Ash is whether the cause of action is one
traditionally relegated to state law that is the concern of the states, so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on implication of a
67
federal statute. This factor has obliged the Court to keep a wary eye to68
wards concerns for federalism. This comes from an assumption made by
the Supreme Court that Congress is familiar with the background of settled
law when it considers a statute and that Congress would not enact a law that
69
would violate fundamental principles of federalism.
This approach may be necessary from a policy perspective since a prospective plaintiff suing under a theory of an implied cause of action is suing
under that theory to get into federal court rather than under a state claim.
However, many times when there is a federal statute violation, there are
63 Cannon, 411 U.S. at 703 (footnote omitted); see also Contu, 450 U.S. at 782-84 (holding that
“the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme indicates that Congress did not intend to create the
right of action asserted by respondent”); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11 (noting the congressional purpose of
the statute as one to “‘assist’ and financially ‘support’ various activities . . .” in ultimately determining
that the statute does not contain a private right of action).
64 Stabile, supra note 18, at 868.
65 Contus, 450 U.S. at 777 (holding that the legislative intent behind the amended statute meant
that “[t]o imply a private right of action here would be to defeat each of these congressional objectives”).
66 E.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 539-41 (1984) (holding that the purposes
of the statute were to have the Securities and Exchange Commission address advisor’s fees rather than
allow for investment companies to litigate privately). This provision of remedies, however, might be
analyzed under either the second factor (by finding that the specification of some remedies precludes all
others) or the first factor (as an examination that remedies provided in the statute specify who has the
rights needed to be protected).
67 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the statute in question
did not constitute an area traditionally relegated to state law and therefore denial of the cause of action
based on this factor was inappropriate).
68 Stabile, supra note 18, at 868.
69 See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected
representatives, like other citizens, know the law . . . ”).
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concurrent state statutes that also hold a potential claim. Part of this factor’s purpose aims towards the idea that it is better policy to encourage
plaintiffs to take their possible federal grievance up through alternative
71
means. This is in keeping with other Supreme Court doctrines to avoid
72
issues that may implicate constitutional problems wherever possible.
73
The Court in Cort cited Borak for this factor, a case where the issue
74
was regulated both by federal as well as state securities laws. This does
not mean that this factor is limited to those situations where a national interest exists. Instead, this factor may be utilized effectively when the cause
of action would make as much sense in federal court as in state courts.
D. Cort and Later Case Modifications
The Cort holding and the four factors garnered unanimous support
75
among the members of the Court at the creation of this test. In later cases,
when the Court began to use the Cort factors to imply causes of action,
76
however, the Justices divided and the Court began to adjust the test itself.
Commentators have argued that the discord among the Justices has not been
about whether to use the Cort factors, but how much weight to place on
77
each particular factor. Indeed, the varying weight that individual justices
appear to place on each factor helps to explain Court decisions that appear
78
to have adjusted the traditional Cort analysis. A modern trend appears to
form showing that cases post-Cort place a greater emphasis on legislative
79
intent than any other factor.

70

HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 26.
See Daily, 464 U.S. at 541 (holding that while a federal statute did exist to help regulate abuses
against a corporation, “a corporation’s rights against its directors or third parties with whom it has contracted are generally governed by state, not federal, law”).
72 E.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (noting that “it is not the habit
of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case”) (internal citations omitted).
73 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
74 Borak, 377 U.S. at 434.
75 Cort, 422 U.S. at 66.
76 Boyer, supra note 19, at 735. Some Justices had also begun to complain about the extension of
the implication doctrine. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (complaining that extension of the implication doctrine creates “a judicial oak which has grown from little more
than a legislative acorn”).
77 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 (majority finding the inquiry to end at the question of legislative history; concurrence finding that the inquiry ends after an examination of rights and legislative
history; dissent demanding an examination of all four factors); Boyer, supra note 19, at 734 (“Dissension has arisen not over the elaboration of a standard for measuring congressional intent, but rather over
its application and the weight to be accorded to the various factors described in Cort.”).
78 Scott, supra note 33, at 702.
79 Peter J. Skalaban, Jr., Borak Breathes: Implying A Private Right of Action to Enforce SEC Rule
14-A-8., 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1522 (1993).
71

2006]

A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash

251

1. The Cannon Adjustment
The first case to make a significant revision in the Court’s analysis of
80
Cort was Cannon v. University of Chicago. In that case, the Court used all
81
four factors in a thorough and methodical search to determine that a cause
of action existed under Section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amend82
ments of 1972. In so implying a cause of action, the Court looked at the
second factor and looked at it with a decidedly expansive view of legislative intent. The fact that the act was similar to other statutes passed at the
83
same time and that Congress passed this statute in light of how lower
84
courts were interpreting related language weighed heavily in the Supreme
Court’s decision.
Especially notable about Cannon is that the Court hinted that its examination of each factor weighed towards finding congressional intent to
create a cause of action even after engaging in a detailed examination of
85
each factor. Additionally, the Cannon Court pointed out that it would at
times “take into account [the] contemporary legal context” of the time that
the statute was passed to determine if there was an implied cause of ac86
tion. Admittedly, it is unclear as to whether Cannon itself represented a
87
broad or narrow approach to the use of context, but it appears certain that
the Court, after Cannon, appeared to take Cort’s four factors and treat them
in a weighted fashion.
Another major effect of Cannon was the resulting dissent by Justice
Powell. Others concurred and dissented from the Court opinion, but no
other side opinion has had as much of a lasting impression on implication
88
89
jurisprudence. While isolated in his dissent, it seems apparent that Justice Powell’s concerns and his proffered approach of using legislative intent
as the most important factor in discerning implied causes of action was destined to become dominant among the Justices.
80

Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
Boyer, supra note 19, at 735 (stating that Justice Steven’s Cort approach was “methodical”).
82 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
83 Id. at 694.
84 Id. at 696-98.
85 Id. at 688 (noting that “before concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to
a special class of litigants, a court must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indicative of such an intent”); see also Stabile, supra note 18, at 868 (“Although the Court analyzed each of
the four Cort factors, it expressly viewed the four factors as the means through which congressional
intent could be discerned.”).
86 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99.
87 Mank, supra note 32, at 848.
88 See, e.g., Key, supra note 19, at 297 (“Reasons for the Court's change in policy concerning
implied causes of action can be gleaned from Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago.”); Boyer, supra note 19, at 736 (“With Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, the battle lines on
the application of Cort were clearly drawn.”).
89 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
81
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2. Touche Ross and Congressional Intent
The second case that meaningfully altered the Cort analysis was
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington where the Court refused to imply a cause
90
of action in Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In this
case, the Court recast the Cort factors into a grand general inquiry into legislative intent. The first major change that the Touche Ross Court brought to
the Cort analysis was to hold explicitly that the four factors were not enti91
tled to equal weight. Additionally, the Court pointed out what commenta92
tors had begun to see all too clearly, namely that several of the Cort factors were better understood as being additional ways to discern legislative
93
intent and not necessarily separate inquiries for their own sake. The
Touche Ross Court therefore attempted to make this fact perfectly clear by
pointing out that implied causes of action cases amounted to exercises in
94
“statutory construction.”
Some have pointed out that while the Touche Ross Court did emphasize the second factor of legislative history as the most important and controlling factor, the Court did not completely remove from analysis the other
three factors. Additionally, critics argue that some semblance of the other
three factors must still be present under Touche Ross if the Court is to find
95
legislative intent necessary to warrant implication. For example, one

90

Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576.
Id. at 575.
92 E.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate Impact Suits, 34 GA. L. REV.
1155, 1230 (2000) (“Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further confirmed that the Cort factors are
relevant only insofar as they serve as proxies for legislative intent.”); Stabile, supra note 18, at 869 (“In
the wake of Cannon, Transamerica, and Touche Ross, the Supreme Court has either ignored the Cort
factors altogether, or used them only as evidence of congressional intent.”); Skalaban, supra note 79, at
1526 (“The Court refused to explore the third Cort factor—whether an implied right is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the section—on the basis of a sweeping statement that effectively reformulated
the four-step Cort test . . . .”); Boyer, supra note 19, at 727 (arguing that “an examination of the case law
surrounding Cort demonstrates that the Supreme Court's mandate, indecisive at best, leaves room for a
variety of factors to serve as interpretive tools”); Scott, supra note 33, at 706 (noting that “congressional
intent [would] later . . . become the crucible of implication cases”); Paul E. Harner, Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 1987 DUKE L.J. 915, 920 (1987)
(“The Supreme Court's strong emphasis on legislative intent also appeared in subsequent implied right
of action cases.”); Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1076 (“In a series of statutory implied right of action
cases after Cort, the congressional intent branch of the Cort inquiry increasingly displaced the competing notion that rights could be enforced without specific congressional intent.”); Steven M. Schuetze,
Note, Thompson v. Thompson: The Jurisdictional Dilemma of Child Custody Cases Under the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 409, 422 (1989) (noting that “the four factors have been
interpreted as merely relevant in determining whether a private remedy should be implied”).
93 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76 (noting that “the first three factors discussed in Cort—the
language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, are ones traditionally relied
upon in determining legislative intent”).
94 Id. at 568; see also Northwest, 451 U.S. at 91 (holding that the Court’s “task is one of statutory
construction”).
95 Boyer, supra note 19, at 738.
91
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commentator has pointed out that the first factor remains significant be96
cause of the growing importance of the second factor.
The Court, on occasion, has appeared to lean on a presumption that
when some remedy is granted in the statute, legislative intent will not be
found to support the implied cause of action because “when Congress
wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did
97
so expressly.” To be sure, this is a view that appears more strongly held
98
99
among specific Justices rather than among the Court generally. This po100
sition, however, is not without historical roots.
3.

Transamerica and the Break Up of the First Two Factors

The third case to revise the Cort analysis was Transamerica Mortgage
101
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 did not have an implied cause of action
102
based on violation of the Act’s anti-fraud provision. The Court accepted
that Congress intended to create a class of people entitled to certain rights
103
under the Act. Nevertheless, the Court refused implication based on the
distinction that legislative history supporting a cause of action and legisla104
tive intent to create a class of individuals were two different inquiries. In
addition to this, the Supreme Court began a movement away from its view
96 Id. (noting that “[the Court’s] conclusion was based largely on a finding under the first factor
that the statutory scheme was designed only to facilitate supervision of brokerage activities by the Securities and Exchange Commission, not to benefit the plaintiff’s class”).
97 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572; see also Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 (“Congress knew how to
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so . . . . But it did not.”).
98 E.g., Carlson, 446 U.S. at 40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it is obvious that when
Congress has wished to authorize federal courts to grant damages relief, it has known how to do so and
has done so expressly”); Musick, 508 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J.) (pointing out that “[the Court has] asked
whether Congress ‘expressly or by clear implication’ envisioned a contribution right to accompany the
substantive damages right created or, failing that, whether Congress ‘intended courts to have the power
to alter or supplement the remedies enacted’”) (internal citations omitted).
99 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the main themes of the
Court's opinion [include] that . . . Congress knows how to legislate. [This] proposition[] [is] unexceptionable, but [is not a] reason to eliminate the private right of action against aiders and abettors of violations of § 10(b) and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Rule 10b-5.”).
100 See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 405 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Congress could not have been ignorant of the remedy of restitution. It knew how to give remedies it wished
to confer. There was no need to add this one. Nor do I think it did so. It did not give it expressly. I do not
think ‘other order’ in the context of [the statute] includes it.”); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195, 204 (1962) (Black, J.) (“If Congress had intended that s 301 [sic] suits should also not be
subject to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it certainly seems likely that it
would have made its intent known in this same express manner.”); Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19 (Stewart, J.) (holding that “it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it”).
101 Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 18-19.
104 Id.
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that finding a protected or designated class of citizens was one of the most
105
accurate determinations and the analytical adjustment here could be
greater than the Court itself appeared to admit. The Court consequently
continued its primary focus on congressional intent while attempting to
separate the factors further from any possible confusion amongst each
106
other. The Court also appeared to rest part of its rationale on the fact that
the statute, by expressly providing for some remedies, displayed an implicit
107
legislative intent to deny others.
Some have pointed out that the true novelty of Transamerica was the
Court’s separation of whether a right existed from whether a remedy ex108
isted. Until that decision, the Court consistently seemed to hold that
wherever it found a right, the other three factors would presumably fall into
109
place in order to imply a cause of action. Transamerica’s value therefore
may also lay in the modification to the traditional Cort test so that the inquiry into the second factor is restricted to indications of congressional intent in the statute and accompanying legislative history rather than general
110
examinations of congressional intent.
4. Thompson and the Changing Intent Standard
The fourth case where the Cort analysis appeared to break down was
111
Thompson v. Thompson. The Supreme Court in this case ensured that the
four Cort factors would receive varying weight by failing to explain each of
the four factors specifically and instead resting almost exclusively on the
112
question of congressional intent. Although a unanimous Court refused to
113
imply a cause of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
the Justices nevertheless divided on how to go about inferring congressional
intent between the majority’s understanding and that of Justice Scalia. The
Court as well as the concurrences appeared to agree with the view that the
114
“focal point is Congress’s intent in enacting the statute” and that the four
105 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-91 n.13 (“Not surprisingly, the right- or duty-creating language of the
statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action.”).
106 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15.
107 Id. at 19.
108 Boyer, supra note 19, at 739.
109 See, e.g., Cort, 422 U.S. at 80 (finding no benefited class and equally finding no implied cause
of action); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 (pointing out that “[u]nquestionably, . . . the first of the four factors
identified in Cort favors the implication of a private cause of action” and equally finding an implied
cause of action); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 (failing to find a benefited class and equally failing to
find an implied cause of action).
110 Boyer, supra note 19, at 740.
111 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
112 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 422.
113 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179.
114 Id. at 179.
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factors of Cort have been used “as guides to discerning that intent.”
However, the majority and the concurring members of the Court soon
parted ways when the majority explained its understanding of congressional
intent by explaining that “our focus on congressional intent does not mean
that we require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute,
116
actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of action.”
Some have argued that these four cases taken together have effectively
117
overruled Cort v. Ash despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never
officially announced such a ruling. Notably, some of those who argue that
Cort v. Ash has been overruled still are receptive to use the case in some,
118
albeit limited, circumstances. Thus, some scholars remain adamant that
119
Cort is no longer “good law” while others have accepted the continued
use of the Cort analysis and have instead argued that these and other cases
120
merely help to mold the factors into a more refined analysis.
E.

The New, Improved Cort Test

The Supreme Court appears content with a new and updated form of
the Cort analysis. This approach has remained a mixture of the subjective
121
and objective factors mentioned in Cort. The most important factor appears to be congressional intent as understood through legislative history.
This does not mean that the search for especial classes given rights under
the statute no longer remains a factor to consider. Nor, for that matter, has
the question of general legislative purpose disappeared from the scene. It
115

Id.
Id.; see also id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am at a loss to imagine what congressional
intent to create a private right of action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind the
creation of a private right of action.”).
117 Id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort
v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis.”) (internal citations omitted). Justice O’Connor joined all parts of Scalia’s concurrence that
include this rationale, but wrote separately to avoid joining Scalia’s entire rationale. Thompson, 484 U.S.
at 188 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
118 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (pointing out that while implication cases have been less expansive, “causes of action that came into existence
under the ancient regime should be limited by the same logic that gave them birth”).
119 Lambert, supra note 92, at 1231 (pointing out that “a number of lower courts have recognized
this ‘effective overruling’ and have opined that the Court’s new emphasis exclusively on legislative
intent results in a more stringent test for implied private rights of action”) (internal footnotes omitted);
Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1078 (“While never overruled, Cort has become obsolete as the Court has
focused on congressional intent to create judicial remedies.”); Zeigler, supra note 18, at 88 (“Cort became like a ghost attempting to regain solid form, appearing relatively substantial in one case only to
fade to transparency in the next.”). Lower courts have not ignored the implications of this critique. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Since the late
1970’s, the Court has gradually receded from reliance on three of these four factors, focusing more and
more exclusively on legislative intent alone.”).
120 Harner, supra note 92, at 923.
121 Cross, supra note 4, at 157.
116
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does lend credence to the notion that abstract notions of federalism tend to
carry little credible weight in implication cases though.
1. The Dominance of Congressional Intent
The recent understanding of the Cort test has placed the question of
122
congressional intent as the paramount and controlling factor. Under this
approach, the Court has generally denied a cause of action unless there is
123
clear evidence that Congress intended it to exist, usually not without a
124
plain statement to that effect. While at least one Justice cites judicial def125
erence to Congress as the basis for this position, for some reason that
approach has never had the intellectual force to inspire debate among
scholars. Other Justices have relied on congressional intent as understood
126
by the existence (or nonexistence) of alternative remedial provisions.
Some have attempted to impress the idea that implication cases are a sub127
category of general statutory construction cases, but that rationale alone
128
129
has not been terribly moving to the Court or scholars. Some scholars
have argued for a theory of “rights equals remedies,” i.e., that the entire
source of the Court’s jurisdictional power to hear an implication case comes
130
from general power of judicial review, though the Supreme Court has
122 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (limiting the inquiry “solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action . . . ”). Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (“The intent of
Congress remains the ultimate issue, however, and ‘unless this congressional intent can be inferred from
the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for
implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.’”); Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992)
(“The most important inquiry here . . . is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy sought
by the plaintiffs.”); see also Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103 (noting that “the importance of enquiring
specifically into intent to authorize a private cause of action became clear only later . . . in Touche Ross,
[and only then] was this intent accorded primacy among the considerations that might be thought to bear
on any decisions to recognize a private remedy”); see also Cross, supra note 4, at 157 (“Although [the
Supreme Court’s] more recent decisions still apply the four-part test, any evidence of Congressional
intent is virtually controlling.”).
123 See Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1102 (“The rule that has emerged in the years since Borak and
Mills came down is that recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute must
ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy.”).
124 Alexander Willscher, Comment, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption Challenges to State
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 265 (2000).
125 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 724 (White, J., dissenting).
127 As mentioned in note 92 supra, this idea is not entirely without precedent.
128 Northwest, 451 U.S. 77 (stating that there is a distinction between statutory interpretation and
implication: “the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt”).
129 Stabile, supra note 18, at 878 (noting that the approach of statutory construction “does not
provide a persuasive rationale”); but see Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1532 (“The implication inquiry is a
matter of statutory construction.”).
130 Stabile, supra note 18, at 882; Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1079-81; Davant, supra note 50, at
629-30. This argument posits that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), itself was an
implied cause of action case. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
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131

declined this route. In a similar vein, others have argued that a narrow
132
focus on congressional intent misses the point, though this argument appears to tilt at the Supreme Court windmills by longing for a return to a past
133
view of implication that ignores current Court jurisprudence.
The last attempt to harmonize various Court efforts at inferring congressional intent was by Justice Marshall writing for the majority in Thomp134
son. While this helped to explain what the Court has looked at for infer135
ring legislative intent, it failed to provide a clear explanation of why the
Court has focused almost exclusively on the subject.
a) Justice Powell’s Separation of Powers Approach. Justice Powell
may have articulated the best reason for implying a cause of action based
136
on congressional intent in his previously noted side opinion of Cannon.
Justice Powell’s argument rests on the view that when the Supreme Court
starts to imply causes of action that were not expressly provided for by the
statute, the Court violates basic separation of powers concerns because it
implicitly takes upon itself jurisdiction of issues that have not necessarily
137
been expressly granted by Congress.
This argument posits that if a remdissenting) (citing Marbury as an implied cause of action case). This argument is unpersuasive since
Marshall himself bifurcated the issue of rights and remedies pointing out that while a right may exist
and a remedy may be needed to affect that right, the power of the court remains a critical issue in discerning whether that ultimate right can be remedied. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 168 (where, after answering
the question as to whether a right was granted to Marbury, the Court then examined whether the plaintiff
was entitled to the remedy requested based (in part) on “the power of this court”).
131 E.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant
has a cause of action is ‘analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant
may be entitled to receive.’”); Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284 (holding that “a plaintiff suing under an
implied right of action still must show that the statute manifests an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy”) (internal quotations omitted).
132 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1079 (“Requiring that Congress intend to allow parties to bring
lawsuits to enforce their rights is like requiring that, in addition to intending to make a contract, parties
to a contract also intend to allow themselves to be sued.”). This argument appears to miss the additional
nuance that in the paradigm contract case, only two parties exist: the offeror and the offeree, whereas in
the paradigm implication case, at least three parties exist: the plaintiff, the defendant, and the Congress
that passed the statute without explicitly determining if a cause of action existed.
133 E.g., Tex. Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“Our focus, as it is
in any case involving the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress.”); Thompson, 484
U.S. 174; Daily, 464 U.S. at 535-36 (“In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the intent of
Congress when it enacted the statute in question.”). But see Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1115 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (expressing the view that the Court had declared “guerrilla
warfare” against private rights of action under federal securities violations).
134 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177.
135 Id. at 179.
136 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 19, at 297 (noting
that “[r]easons for the Court’s change in policy concerning implied causes of action can be gleaned from
Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago”).
137 Stabile, supra note 18, at 879. At least some scholars have argued that Justice Powell’s insistence on congressional intent implicates more than just separation of powers but also federalism concerns. E.g., Richard W. Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implication of Implied Rights of Action, 34
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edy should exist for this matter, it should come from Congress after hearings, debate, and a legislative vote and not from judges, who are themselves
138
not politically accountable. Additionally, implying causes of action without requiring at least congressional intent to warrant implication runs the
risk of contributing to legislative apathy. Worse still, Congress may become
increasingly indifferent to its responsibilities on difficult matters that it
139
should consider when passing new laws. Other Justices on the Court have
140
articulated this position.
Justice Powell’s separation of powers argument rests on a presumption
that Congress, rather than the Court should be the one to decide ultimately
and finally the possibility of a cause of action under the statute. It naturally
follows that if any Cort factor were to carry a controlling weight, it should
be the factor most directly related to the views of Congress on the matter:
141
legislative history and legislative intent. The problem of a four-factor test
with each factor having equal weight is that some of the factors “too easily
may be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to
permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of
142
private enforcement.” For this reason, when the legislative history is
143
clear, Justice Powell would follow the clear lead of Congress.
b) Powell’s Critics. Some scholars have argued that this approach to
144
separation of powers is a bit too simplistic. They point out that separation

MERCER L. REV. 973, 1003 (1983) (explaining “the obvious advantages of congressional decisions over
court decisions in safeguarding the federalist nature of our government are that Congress is politically
responsible and that the states are actually represented in the Senate”); Clark, supra note 55, at 1423
(accord).
138 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731.
139 Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that “[Cort] invites Congress to avoid resolution of
the often controversial question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private
litigation”).
140 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188-91 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that implying causes
of action too freely would abridge the role of Congress); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that separation of powers concerns may limit a court’s freedom to imply causes of
action).
141 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Absent the most compelling evidence of
affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.”).
142 Id. at 740.
143 See Miguel A. Vaca, Comment, Arbitrating Civil Rico and Implied Causes of Action Arising
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 455, 466 (1987) (“For
Justice Powell, RICO’s title and legislative history clearly prevented the statute from applying to ‘garden variety fraud,’ breach of contract cases, and ‘innocent businessmen’ whom Congress did not intend
to reach with the statute.”).
144 Stabile, supra note 18, at 879 n.102 (“Justice Powell overstates the case. Judges may be immune from the political process, but they are not immune to political influences and predispositions.”).
Equally, one scholar has argued:
[t]he extreme position taken by Justice Powell is amplified by the observation that the twenty federal appellate decisions he cites as unconstitutionally implying private rights of action are not
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of powers concerns are more nuanced and that the Supreme Court has held
145
as much. While this may be correct generally, it may neglect the point
that the Court at times is satisfied enough with a “simplistic” understanding
of constitutional doctrines when a more nuanced understanding would viti146
ate logic and the blueprint of the Constitution.
Scholars additionally argue that Powell’s approach is internally incon147
sistent with his deference for Congressional will. They argue Powell’s
refusal to imply a cause of action based on anything other than legislative
intent is a false desire because Congress, if it believes that the Court has
gone too far in implying the right into the statute, can always repeal that
148
judicial interpretation by passing a clearer statute. Hence, because the
Court is engaged in statutory interpretation and therefore can be overruled
by statutory amendment, a misinterpretation does not rise to the level of a
149
separation of powers problem.
This argument is flawed in that it assumes that an action by the Court
in an area that may violate constitutional issues should be permissible because they can be rectified by later Congressional action. In layman’s terms,
it argues that two wrongs (Congressional inaction and an incorrect decision
by the Supreme Court) can make a right because they can always be fixed

products of the liberal Warren Court era. Rather, a substantial number of judges who decided these
cases were appointed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. To argue that these strict constructionist
judges, as many of them undoubtedly may fairly be categorized, are engaging in judicial legislation is an overstatement. In essence, Justice Powell's opinion suggests that he may be unfamiliar
with the legislative process. He wants Congress to speak loudly and clearly whenever it seeks to
effectuate a legislative objective. Although the implementation of this practice would be desirable,
it is unrealistic. Legislation is often ambiguous, not because ambiguity is desirable, but because
compromise, with the attendant loss of clarity, is required for passage of the legislation. Such a result may be unfortunate, but at least frequently in our system, it is the nature of the legislative
process.
Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 4041 (1979).
145 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity”); see also Creswell, supra note 137, at 990-91; Stabile, supra note 18, at 879 (arguing that
the Supreme Court has “long since abandoned a literal application of separation of powers, which would
require a strict and absolute separation between the functions of the branches of the federal government”).
146 See generally Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (denying
Congress the ability of a single house veto because doing so would undermine the basic constitutional
provisions of bicameralism and presentment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (denying
Congress the power to command the states to act in furtherance of newly passed federal gun laws as it
would be a violation of principles of federalism).
147 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 749 (complaining that Justice Powell’s “fear is belied . . . by the
fact that, given the remedial nature of the judicial role, elaboration of proper enforcement mechanisms
by the courts reflects a sensible allocation of functions between the judiciary and legislature”) (internal
quotes omitted).
148 Id. at 749-50.
149 Id.
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later. Ironically, this claim as well as the scholarly response to Justice Powell’s approach raises yet another constitution problem by asking Congress to
decide who will be the final arbiter of the Constitutional issue of separation
of powers in implied cause of action cases: the Supreme Court or Congress.
Based on this inconsistency some scholars have gone so far as to make the
claim that Justice Powell’s focus on Cort’s second factor overruled Mar150
bury v. Madison.
Recent cases tend to reflect that Powell’s concerns resonate with the
151
current Court. In fact, one could make the argument that current Justices’
concern with the Supreme Court’s Cort approach has not been that the
analysis focuses on legislative intent. The concern has instead been that the
inquiry into legislative intent has been so expansive that the legislative materials examined might not be terribly accurate indicators of Congress’s
152
actual intent. The post-Cannon Court still examines implications based
153
ostensively on all four factors; however, it appears increasingly apparent
that an affirmative (or negative) finding on the issue of legislative history as
154
it leads to congressional intent will tend to decide the issue prematurely.
2. The Search for Rights Remains Important
This is not to imply that the first Cort factor is lacking all significance.
In fact, this factor seems to remain important in determining many implica155
tion cases. For example, in Touche Ross, the Supreme Court did stop the
examination of each Cort factor before it could be determined whether they
150

See supra note 130 for a discussion of Marbury.
See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (“The [Cort] test reflects a
concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability
of remedies for violations of statutes.”); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Thompson, 484 U.S. 174; Musick,
508 U.S. at 291 (holding that Supreme Court precedents “teach that the creation of new rights ought to
be left to legislatures, not courts”). Clark, supra note 55, at 1423 (“The Supreme Court’s current approach to implied private rights of action [responds] to these concerns.”).
152 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We have said, to be sure, that the
existence of intent may be inferred from various indicia; but that is worlds apart from today's Delphic
pronouncement that intent is required but need not really exist.”).
153 See Harner, supra note 92, at 920 (noting that “the Court has declined to adopt Justice Powell’s
suggested rejection of Cort in favor of exclusive reliance on express congressional intent”); Boyer,
supra note 19, at 741 (arguing that at least as of 1985, “a majority of the Court, including Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, continues to espouse Cort as the proper framework for
determining congressional intent”). This view may no longer be the case. As the appendix shows, since
1997, the majority of the Court has tilted against implications, implying a cause of action in just one
case. In fact, a “head count” of the justices (counting concurrences as supportive of the majority) shows
that for the last six years, at least four Justices—Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—have consistently refused to imply a cause of action while O’Connor has tended to join that position in most cases.
154 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576 (stopping the examination of the Cort factors after examining
the first three factors).
155 E.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at 771-72, (“The Court consistently has found that Congress intended to
create a cause of action ‘where the language of the statute explicitly [confers] a right directly on a class
of persons that [includes] the plaintiff in the case.’”).
151
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156

supported implication. Nevertheless, the Court appeared to weigh heavily
157
the fact that the statute appeared to confer no right. Though the Court did
lessen the importance of the rights factor, it did not remove it entirely from
158
the equation. Even Justice Powell, the strongest proponent of elevating of
the second factor above the other three, did not go so far as to excise the
159
Cort analysis when given the chance.
Scholars have additionally pointed out that the first factor remains important “because the Court must consider the purpose of a cause of action in
160
deciding whether Congress intended to create it.” They argue that it is
logically “almost impossible to answer the question of whether Congress
intended to create a cause of action to enforce the right the plaintiff asserts
161
without deciding whether the statute actually confers the right.” Others
have pointed out, however, that either “the congressional intent or the rights
element of Cort had to eventually predominate, because in mixing the two
162
elements, Cort embraced a contradiction.”
Faced with this choice, it appears that Court did minimize the impor163
tance of rights in relation to congressional intent. Recent cases suggest
164
that this trend will continue. This result may yet beg the question of
whether the Court simply avoids decisions based on a rights analysis and
instead categorizes the issue as one of congressional intent.
Even if the Court as a whole does not appear to engage in a rights
analysis with the same gusto that it demonstrates towards legislative history
and legislative intent, certainly individual Justices on the Court continue to
do so. For example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Cannon,
argued that when “it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons
certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private

156

Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 569.
158 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 n.13. (noting that “the right- or duty-creating language of the statute
has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action . . . .
This Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly
conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case.”).
159 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (examining the statute under all four factors of the Cort test).
160 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 110.
161 Id. at 111; see also Davant, supra note 50, at 635 (arguing that “if regulations do not create
rights, then the regulations cannot be privately enforced”).
162 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1078.
163 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 12 (denying plaintiff a private right of action for damages despite
finding that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the statute in question); see also Contu, 450 U.S.
at 771 (holding that “the fact that an enactment is designed to benefit a particular class does not end the
inquiry; instead, it must also be asked whether the language of the statute indicates that Congress intended that it be enforced through private litigation”).
164 E.g., Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S. Ct . 872, 878 (2004)
(“That Congress created these duties, however, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they
can be enforced by means of a [cause of action].”).
157

135

FIU Law Review

262

[1:239

cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such an action would
165
be controlling.” Some scholars have retorted, however, that a straightforward reading of this language is uncalled for because it would be “so
broad that a seemingly endless number of statutes would appear to confer a
federal right on one class or another in satisfaction of the first of the four
166
Cort tests.”
Furthermore, the Court has held that implications do not require explicit grant of a right. Instead, the grant of some right to a class of citizens
167
can be implicit in the language and structure of the statute. This approach
tends to run the risk that the Court may portray what it is doing as an ex168
amination of the second factor.
3.

Statutory Purpose Is Not Yet Dead
169

In addition, the third factor is still in play, at least somewhat. Some
have pointed out that courts must consider the question of whether implication is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
170
imply [a particular] remedy for the plaintiff” because implication cases,
171
by definition, do not expressly provide a cause of action. Scholars making this argument, based on extrapolations from Supreme Court prece172
173
dent, admittedly argue this point too far. Nevertheless, this contingent
points out that unless the Court looks at the overall background statutory
purpose, it denies itself the ability to answer whether Congress actually
174
intended to imply a cause of action.
Regardless of the correctness of that position, the Supreme Court ap175
pears to have moved further away from this factor in later cases. Thus,
165

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 82) (internal quotes omitted).
Boller, supra note 37, at 1304.
167 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693.
168 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 112.
169 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the creation of an implied cause of action
would further the purpose because “Congress viewed private litigation against exchanges as a valuable
component of the self-regulation concept”); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284 (“To guide the analysis,
we generally examine the relevant statute to ensure that we do not fashion the scope of an implied right
in a manner at odds with the statutory structure and purpose.”).
170 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
171 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 111.
172 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (noting that “the legislative history of a statute that does not
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question”
of whether Congress actually had in mind creation of a private cause of action).
173 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 111 (arguing that implication cases by definition involve silence both
on the statute’s surface as well as in the immediate legislative history). This understanding is not necessarily true. It is entirely possible for the legislative history to be clear on the point while the statute is
itself silent. Otherwise, there would be little need for the second factor of the Cort test itself.
174 Id.
175 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (“Without [congressional intent], a cause of action does not exist
and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how com166
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while cases that rested on this issue have never been overruled, the Court
has expressed the opinion that the current doctrine applies a “stricter stan177
dard.” Some scholars have even gone so far as to call this factor “irrele178
vant” if the first two factors are missing. This is especially enlightening
when one notes that the question of congressional purpose was of some
179
import at the time of Cort, perhaps implying that the change by the Court
in cases such as Touche Ross had more to do with the rising value of congressional intent rather than the decreasing value of statutory purpose.
Some have also pointed out that the search for congressional purpose
is really a continuation of the search for rights, unless somehow interrupted
180
by the second factor during the search through legislative materials. Under this logic, if a right appears conferred by the statute, the Court should
examine whether it would serve the legislative purpose to imply a cause of
action and only refuse implication if the Court finds contrary legislative
181
intent. This concept appears to be an attempt to take the Cort factors and
turn them into a conjunctive test where implication can only occur if the
Supreme Court finds a right plus a purpose and only if legislative intent is
silent or supportive. This would change the original factorial approach that
the original Cort Court and subsequent Court cases have analyzed implica182
tion. This approach thus may go too far, but it logically follows that a
strict understanding of the third factor should rarely lend independent guid183
ance as to whether a statute warrants implication. Most would agree that
the most successful way to further the purpose of protecting a class’s rights

patible with the statute.”). See, e.g., Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298 (holding that because the first two
factors were not found, “it is unnecessary to inquire further to determine whether the purpose of the
statute would be advanced by the judicial implication of a private action . . . ”); Texas Indus, 451 U.S. at
639 (holding that the absence of the first two factors “makes examination of other factors unnecessary”);
see also Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183 (holding that no implied right of action exists because it would be
contrary to “the purpose and context of legislative scheme to infer a private cause of action.”).
176 See infra note 244 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differing beliefs of the Justices on whether Cort has been overruled.
177 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.
178 Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1532.
179 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177 (stating that “one of the chief purposes of the [statute in
question] is to ‘avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts” rather than to allow
for a private right of action); Sec. Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421, 423 (1975) (“It is clear
that the overall structure and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied right . .
. Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the SIPC was, of course, the protection
of investors. It does not follow, however, that an implied right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that
purpose.”).
180 Scott, supra note 33, at 749.
181 Id.
182 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
183 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 601 (holding that the purpose of the statutory scheme, seen through
the congressional intent, required that administrative remedy be the sole remedy of the violation).
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184

would be to allow private litigation under the statute. Thus, if left without
any other indication of legislative intent on the matter, it would appear that
the most logical recourse for the Court to assume that Congress did impli185
edly allow for such private suits.
4.

Federalism: The Cort Non-Factor

“The fourth factor focuses on whether to consider implication in light
of whether the cause of action is a type traditionally relegated to state law
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on a
186
federal statute.” While useful as a factor during the early Cort years, this
factor weakened in strength as corresponding concerns about federalism
187
began to weaken. To be sure, this factor remains present, if only to demark that Congress, presumably aware of the state of Constitutional law,
would not pass a law that would violate federalism principles if it could.
188
Even as concerns of federalism have returned to the forefront, there has
not yet been a concurrent revival of the state law factor in deciding implica189
tion cases. There are even times when the Supreme Court has simply
190
ignored this factor. More strikingly, in some cases the Court refused even
191
to reach this factor of the Cort test. The most that one can say about this
factor today is that it neither hinders nor helps implication in any significant
192
way.

184 See Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (noting that civil litigation provided “a most effective weapon in the
enforcement of the proxy requirements”); see also Bateman, Eichler, Hill & Richards, Inc. v. Berner,
472 U.S. 299, 315-19 (1985) (noting the value of private suits to enforce federal law as having maximum deterrence value).
185 Scott, supra note 33, at 749-52.
186 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
187 That is not to say that concerns of federalism have eroded from the Court entirely, but merely
that as the federal government began to engage in an increasing area of federal control, those areas
considered traditionally regulated by the states have begun to dwindle.
188 E.g., Clark, supra note 55 (arguing that separation of powers is merely a protection of federalism); Robert Knowles, Notes & Comments, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court’s Answer to
Globalization, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 735, 739 (2001) (pointing out that “the Court's most recent decisions
make it clear that the comprehensive revival of federalism will continue”).
189 Some have noted that the Court is beginning to swing towards a neo-classical understanding of
federalism. Even if true, it has not led the Court to give greater credence to the fourth Cort factor as of
this writing. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182-83.
190 E.g., Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 13-18; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 639-40; Transamerica, 444
U.S. at 15-25.
191 E.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708-09; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298 (holding that since the first two
factors were not found, “it is unnecessary to inquire further to determine . . . whether such a remedy is
within the federal domain of interest”).
192 Scott, supra note 33, at 753. This factor may not be completely dead yet. In Thompson, the
petitioner argued that implication would not violate jurisdictional concerns because the merits of the
child custody case (a traditional state issue) itself would not be decided. The Supreme Court denied this
argument based on the reasoning that if it found a private remedy, then a federal court could determine
the case on the merits. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 187 n.4.
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The basic problem with this factor is that most federal statutes for
193
which plaintiffs seek implication involve inherently federal issues. For
example, while state securities laws do exist, they simply do not compare in
194
range and effect as the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. A
survey of the last ten implied cause of action cases examined by the Court
has revealed few issues where the state regulations, where they have regu195
lated, are of the same significance and reach as its federal counterpart.
Indeed, many scholars appear to note this factor as a mere afterthought in
196
respect to current Court analysis of Cort.
At least one scholar has attempted to revive this factor, however, urg197
ing that it should remain as a viable issue for the Court to consider. In
this understanding, concerns of federalism always remain a consideration
while the corresponding issues of congressional intent remain weakened a
198
bit. This argument attempts to simplify the inquiry somewhat to ask if the
plaintiff would be able to sue under any applicable and viable theory of
state law. For instance, if a potential cause of action would violate a federal
law as well as state tort law, “courts should be particularly deferential to
199
state law and state remedies.”
III. IMPROVING THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT FACTOR
If one accepts that implied causes of action now turn mainly on the determination of congressional intent, the inquiry must therefore focus on
“how much” intent must exist before the action will lie. The Supreme Court
has hinted but never quantified the amount of intent needed, but there are
some clues about the quality of intent that needs to be in the legislative record. On this point, two extreme positions seem to have risen. The first is
that of Justice Scalia, who has taken Justice Powell’s concerns towards implication generally and has argued for the Court to discard the congressional

193 Even when the issue is not inherently federal, the Supreme Court has shown little compunction
with interpreting the federal statute narrowly to avoid conflicting with the state law. See Pennhurst, 451
U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the statute in question did not constitute an area traditionally relegated to
state law and therefore denial of the cause of action based on this factor was inappropriate).
194 Borak, 377 U.S. at 426.
195 See appendix.
196 E.g., Lambert, supra note 92, at 1230 (pointing out that “the first three factors discussed in
Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose . . . —are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legislative intent”); id. at 1232 (“A plaintiff may bring a private
action, in the absence of express provision of such an action, only if he proves—from the legislative
history, language or structure of the statute, or from the circumstances of the statute’s enactment—that
Congress intended such private actions to be brought.”) (internal footnotes omitted); Scott, supra note
33, at 753 (noting that “the significance or effect of demonstrating the federal nature of the right, and
thereby satisfying the fourth Cort factor, is questionable under recent cases, however.”).
197 Stabile, supra note 18, at 907.
198 Id. at 903-08.
199 Id. at 906.
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intent factor in favor of expressed intent, to be used only when the intent is
200
unmistakable and clear. The second view has been that of scholars and
(from time to time) some Justices who imply that actual congressional intent itself can be entirely neutral or even non-existent and yet other factors
may still lend understanding as to what Congress would want the Court to
201
do. While the former argument seems to hold the stronger rationale, neither argument appears to be appealing pragmatically or theoretically for the
Supreme Court. This Comment offers a third approach, namely asking the
Court to require that some intent must be used in implication cases, but only
when there is a sufficient objective indication in the legislative record that
such intent, if found, would indicate clearly that the legislature intended a
cause of action to be implied.
A.

Scalia’s Approach

Justice Scalia’s view on implied causes of action is to some extent
202
simply an extension of Justice Powell’s earlier criticisms. Both appear to
view the problem in terms of judicial encroachment on the traditionally
203
congressional areas of lawmaking. The difference, however, is one of
degree. Justice Powell argued that using all four parts of the Cort test is
incorrect because doing so fails to focus properly on the statute and the
204
intent of the statute. Justice Scalia’s approach responds that using any of
the factors of Cort runs the risk of not being true to what the legislature
205
enacted, regardless of their intent. Justice Scalia therefore appears to have
206
developed a new corollary to Justice Powell’s approach. For that reason
that Justice Powell’s initial concerns brought forth a relatively swift shift in
200 See Marc I. Steinberg & William A. Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and
Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67, 82 n.112 (1993) (arguing that acceptance of congressional intent
still would not satisfy Justice Scalia’s approach).
201 See infra, notes 275-85 and accompanying text on contextualism.
202 Scott, supra note 33, at 714 n.115 (noting that Justice Scalia’s approach towards implied causes
of action are “along [the] line” of Justice Powell); see also Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look:
Central Bank After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 576
n.198 (1996) (noting that Justice Powell has criticized implied causes of action and that “in particular,
Justice Scalia has harshly criticized the Court's use of the implication doctrine . . . ”).
203 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring).
204 See Steinberg & Reece, supra note 200, at 82 n.112 (“Justice Scalia's disdain for the implication of private remedies reminds one of Justice Powell's vigorous dissent in Cannon.”)
205 Justice Scalia’s paradigm would find support in the Canadian approach to implied causes of
action. See Cross, supra note 4, at 156 (“Canadian courts will not imply a cause of action from a federal
statute.”). This is ironic given Justice Scalia’s disapproval of the use of international sources in deciding
cases. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting
that “we must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 (noting that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a Constitution”).
206 See Steinberg & Reece, supra note 200, at 82.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is at least possible to consider that the
207
Court may move towards Justice Scalia’s corollary. Thus, a thorough
understanding of his rationale and view is appropriate specifically as it pertains to the current Court understanding of legislative history and legislative
intent.
Justice Scalia has argued that the Court should stop implying causes of
208
action. He argues this from the position that common law itself, while
valuable when engaged in a common law issue, is inapplicable and potentially violative of democratic principles when engaging in statutory inter209
pretation. Part of the reason has been his view that more and more of the
rules governing the actions of the United States come from statutes rather
210
than common law. Because statutory law appears to Justice Scalia to be
211
the wave of the federal law future, engaging in interpretation based on
traditional tools of the common law is fraught with the risk of failure and
212
can smack of separation of powers problems.
Justice Scalia’s largest problem with the Cort analysis stems from the
fact that the approach attempts to give a voice to the intent of the legislature
while Justice Scalia prefers instead to examine the text that the legislature
passed and discern its meaning from ordinary usage of those words passed
213
into law. He rationalizes this approach:
“it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed,
even with fair government, to have what the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver
promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than the trick the emperor Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars,
so that they could not easily be read . . . . Men may intend what they
214
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”

207 But see Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 375-76 (“Because the Rigsby approach prevailed throughout
most of our history, there is no merit to the argument advanced by petitioners that the judicial recognition of an implied private remedy violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
208 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (“If a change is to be made, we should get out of the business of
implied private rights of action altogether.”).
209 See Antonin Scalia, Federal Courts and the Law, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, 9-14
(Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press 1997).
210 Id. at 13.
211 Id. (noting that “[e]very issue of law resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of
text—the text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution” but that “a very small proportion of
judges’ work is constitutional interpretation in any event. (Even in the Supreme Court, I would estimate
that well less than a fifth of the issues we confront are constitutional issues—and probably less than a
twentieth if you exclude criminal-law cases).”).
212 See id. at 14.
213 Id. at 16-17.
214 Id. at 17.
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Scalia may be correct that inferring legislative intent into a statute runs
the risk of leaving the ordinary citizen unsure as to the meaning of the law.
It follows that he is also correct that legislative intent runs the additional
risk of having the judge inadvertently interpret such intent in a way that
215
appears to make him act as a mini-legislature. This is because the judge,
forced to make assumptions about legislative intent, runs an all too great
216
risk of placing her personal beliefs and values into the statute.
This theory of the how to construe intent does not preclude what
217
Scalia labels “lapsus linguae” or a “slip of the tongue” when some congressional intent would be examined where a literal reading in extreme
218
cases would lead to absurd results. This does not give the judge the
power to interpret the statute simply in the light that is most reasonable
since interpretation for the most reasonable intent returns to the problem of
219
the judge replacing congressional intent with his own. This textualist
understanding, Justice Scalia argues, should not be confused with strict
constructionism since textualism does not attempt to interpret a text
220
“strictly” or “leniently” but instead reasonably. While he does note that
critics view the approach as formalistic, he is happy to accept that criticism
221
and instead appears to view that as a virtue.
Justice Scalia turns this understanding of interpretation towards impli222
cation cases in much the same manner. He argues, “legislative history
223
should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”
This is because implication cases present a “distinctive difficulty because
[they] involve[] one of those so-called ‘implied’ causes of action that, for
several decades, this Court was prone to discover in—or, more accurately,
224
create in reliance upon—federal legislation.” Justice Scalia’s view on
225
legislative history is not without precedent on the Court. Justice Scalia
215 Id. at 18 (“When you are told to decide not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the
basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best
shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask what a wise and intelligent person should have
meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to
mean.”).
216 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 427.
217 Scalia, supra note 209, at 20.
218 Id.
219 See id.
220 Id. at 23. As an example of this distinction, Justice Scalia cites Smith v. United States, 508 U.S.
223 (1993), where the Court interpreted “use” of a firearm to include the sale of a gun. Id. Justice Scalia
argues that such an interpretation, being clearly outside of the scope of the text, could only be found by
a strict construction. Scalia, supra note 209, at 23.
221 Id. at 25.
222 Id. at 29-37.
223 Id. at 29-30.
224 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring).
225 E.g., United States v. Pub. Util. Communications of California, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by
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argues that interpretation by use of legislative history is merely a new
method used by judges and Justices to justify the search for legislative in226
tent.
Part of his concern about legislative history’s uses is that, besides con227
cerns about separation of powers, its use does not necessarily clarify the
228
interpretation of the statute. This is because the legislature who finally
must pass the law commonly have not engaged in the writing of the actual
229
legislative history. Worse, the actual members of Congress often may not
230
have even read the legislative history. Moreover, there have been some
glaring modern examples of this problem since Justice Scalia first voiced
231
this issue such as that of the recent appropriation of $400 billion Pentagon budget in which, upon being asked why he voted “present” rather than
in support of the bill, Brian Baird, the United States Representative from
Vancouver, Oregon, admitted:
The frustrating thing is that thing will become law before anyone except the few, the handful on the conference committee, have had a
chance to read it. We had a two- or three-page handout, and it hit the
highlights . . . . This was an authorization bill. There's no reason other
than politics that that had to be done on Friday . . . . But $400 billion
232
deserves more than three hours' review.
Based on these concerns and similar views as it pertains to separation
of powers concerns, legislative history (or at least legislative history as it is
understood in a Congressional Report) is simply not enough to either indicate legislative intent or have the same power as that of the passed law and
233
therefore should not be used. Notably, Justice Scalia has asserted that in
one of the only cases in which he was tempted to use legislative history, his
234
result would have differed from those who did use that history.
With this understanding of Scalia’s view on the uses and failures of
legislative intent (and vicariously legislative history used to discern that
analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress. When we decide from legislative history, including statements of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put
ourselves in the place of a majority of Congressmen and act according to the impression we think this
history should have made on them. Never having been a Congressman, I am handicapped in that weird
endeavor. That process seems to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.”).
226 Scalia, supra note 209, at 31.
227 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769-70 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although I agree with much in Part IV [of
the majority’s opinion], I cannot join it because the judicial lawmaking role it invites would commit the
Federal Judiciary to a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.”).
228 Scalia, supra note 209, at 32.
229 Id. at 34.
230 Id. at 32-34 (citing to 128 Cong. Rec. 16918-19, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 19, 1982).
231 See Baird Discusses Bills, Seniors, OREGONIAN, Nov. 11, 2003, at B1-B2.
232 Id.
233 Scalia, supra note 209, at 35.
234 Id. at 36.
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intent), it is little surprise that Scalia has rarely supported implied causes of
235
action. To be sure, he has supported judgments acknowledging implied
causes of action in certain cases where the Court already previously inter236
preted the statute to contain a private remedy. Those situations, however,
237
may be limited to specific situations that created them. In general, his
238
interpretation has been one of the more consistent doctrines on this issue
and his view seems to have strengthened in the eyes of the rest of the Court.
In Thompson, Justice Scalia’s view on the matter broke into the
239
open. Part of the reason for this was the Court’s statement of belief that
“our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require evidence
that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the
240
creation of a private cause of action.” In rebutting this assumption, however, Justice Scalia appears to accept the existence (though admittedly re241
jecting the use) of a middle ground. Notably, while attempting to dispute
the majority’s view, Justice Scalia helped to fuel an already raging debate
242
on the validity of the use of context in implication cases. Justice Scalia
243
may oppose the use of such a method of interpretation, but other judges
and scholars have taken up the cause. In fact, some have gone so far as to
suggest that Justice Scalia’s own assumptions in this decision lacked foun244
dation.

235

See appendix.
E.g., Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364-66 (Scalia, J., concurring); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76-78 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging an implied cause of action in a statute where previous Supreme Court cases
have interpreted the same statute); see also David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to his Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1413 n.188, (1999)
(arguing that Justice Scalia has been more supportive than expected towards the use of precedent). But
see N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting an implied cause
of action but arguing that “the cause of action at issue here was created not by us, but by Congress”).
237 In fact, Lampf dealt with an implied right to recover against others once an implied cause of
action has been found against a defendant. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 352; see also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 78
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because of legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, it is too late in the day to
address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title IX would be appropriate.”).
238 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174 (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to imply a cause of
action based on legislative intent and legislative history); Jett, 491 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(joining the Court “except insofar as it relies upon legislative history”).
239 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188.
240 Id. at 178.
241 Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “the Court’s opinion exaggerates the difficulty of
establishing an implied right when it surmises that ‘[the implied cause of action doctrine would be a
virtual dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its
evident intention to provide a cause of action’ . . . that statement rests upon the erroneous premise that
one never implies anything except when he forgets to say it expressly”) (internal citations omitted).
242 Id. at 190.
243 Id.
244 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 426 (arguing that “even though Scalia argued that Cort was overruled by later cases, he misread those later decisions . . . . As such, Cort has not been overruled, but has
merely been limited”).
236
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245

In Alexander v. Sandoval, Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that statutory intent to determine if a statute contains an implied
246
cause of action is determinative. He then pointed out that “without it, a
cause does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable
247
that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”
248
This approach may have received new adherents on the Court.
1.

Other Doctrines Support Scalia’s Approach

Scalia’s views are not out of keeping with other reigning Supreme
Court doctrines. As an example, when federalism issues have arisen and a
state court attempts to address a potentially federal issue, the Supreme
Court has required that the state court express a clear statement to the effect
249
that it has decided the issue based on state law. As the Supreme Court
pointed out, if the state court “indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds,
250
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.” Thus, when a
plaintiff asks the Court to examine a decision by a state court that decided
the issue under state grounds, the Supreme Court will defer to the state’s
251
interpretation. Alternatively, if the state court does not so expressly state
that it is deciding the case on state grounds, but instead appears to decide
the issue based on federal concerns, the Supreme Court can, and arguably
252
253
must, intervene.
Admittedly, the analogy between the Court’s plain statement rule and
Justice Scalia’s implied causes of action rule have significant differences.
For instance, while the former addresses federalism concerns between the
state and federal government, implication cases involve primarily separa-

245

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
Id. at 286.
247 Id. at 286-87.
248 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (Souter, J.) (holding that “this Court has recently and repeatedly
said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great
majority of cases.”).
249 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
250 Id. at 1041.
251 It is not always the case that the state and federal grounds are distinct, however. Thomas E.
Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a
Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 800 (1985).
252 See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that “no state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it”).
But see Baker, supra note 251, at 805-07 (“The important distinction to be made is that the doctrine is
not constitutionally required, although it has several possible authorizations.”).
253 In a similar analogy, the Supreme Court has required criminal defendants to clearly and fairly
present federal claims of relief in state court before seeking habeas proceedings in federal court so that
the state court can be alerted of the federal nature of the claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349
(2004).
246
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254

tion of powers issues. Additionally, the former generally stays within the
province of the judicial branches; the latter addresses inter-branch concerns.
However, while those differences may be significant, nevertheless, Supreme Court doctrines in other areas where Constitutional issues create
analogous situations have tended to lead towards similar and analogous
255
tests. Hence, it would not be improper to note that Scalia’s approach to
implied causes of action, i.e., asking for a clear statement from the legislature in the statute itself, would be analogous to other Supreme Court approaches in other areas of constitutional law and therefore not necessarily
as radical a departure as some believe. Some have even hinted that the
256
Court has made strides towards this view without even knowing it,
though it may yet be too early to make that assumption.
2.

Pragmatically, The Supreme Court Will Not Go This Far

Justice Scalia’s criticisms have merit in the circumstance of implication cases. It is difficult to believe that Congress, having gone through the
entire legislative process could pass a statute implying a right of action
without a single legislator voicing a position on whether the statute confers
257
that right. While Scalia’s approach may be sound, the practical matter of
counting Supreme Court Justices shows that it does not appear to hold a
majority of the Court. While Justice Scalia’s view may have attracted some
on the Court, the majority appears to remain tethered to the use of legislative history and legislative intent to determine implication cases. While the
last dozen cases out of the Supreme Court have shown a shift towards less
implication in statutes, the majority has not yet abandoned the theory of

254

Creswell, supra note 137, at 1003 (arguing that federalism concerns also exist in implication

cases).
255 A notable example of this is in the areas of the state powers in light of the Commerce Clause as
compared with the state powers in light of Article IV privileges and immunities. For instance, in S. Pac.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), part of the test for the commerce clause power of the state was whether
the burden placed by the state was against out of state citizens and whether the actions of the state had
comparative benefits that such a burden was reasonable. In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of
Camden County & Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), the Court
noted that part of the Article IV privileges or immunities includes whether there is a substantial burden
placed on out of state citizens and whether the actions of the state would be necessary to solve some evil
related to those out of state citizens.
256 Willscher, supra note 124, at 265 (noting that “although the rest of the Court has not adopted
Justice Scalia’s view, many of the Court’s recent opinions have refused to find a cause of action without
a plain statement from Congress”).
257 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 381 (1978) (holding that “there is no
express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI and it would be quite incredible if Congress,
after so carefully attending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, intended silently to
create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI”); Schuetze, supra note 92, at 429 (“It is hard to
believe that a law could emerge from the cumbersome legislative process without including such a vital
provision as whether the federal courts are available to enforce the law's provisions.”).
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implication as a whole, or even the use of legislative history towards under258
standing that intent.
The majority of the Court may not hold Justice Scalia’s view now or in
259
the near future, but there do appear to be indications that his concerns are
260
currying favor with at least some other Justices on the Court, some lower
261
judges in the federal circuits, as well as scholars in the legal commu262
nity. Some scholars, however, have naturally disputed Scalia on several
of these points. Another expressed concern is that even if one accepts the
concerns expressed by Justices Scalia and Powell that use of Cort’s other
factors, and to some extent, use of legislative intent as the determinative
factor leads to judicial policymaking, still, this offers no reason to oppose
263
the enforcement of a statute that creates rights. Even if one were to accept
that legislative intent itself should not be the determinative factor, the Powell/Scalia approach to implied causes of action still fails to give a valid ar264
gument as to their opposition of all of the Cort factors.
a) Critiquing Scalia’s Assumptions. Others have pointed out that
265
textualism itself is far from a perfect theory on how to interpret statutes.
To them, a statute is far from clear in more cases than Justice Scalia be266
lieves. Justice Scalia’s approach additionally refuses to examine legisla267
tive history to see what those in Congress believed the text meant even
though the Scalia textualist appears willing to look at less direct evidence,
268
such as dictionaries, for guidance on the meaning of a statute. This ap-

258

See appendix.
See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004) (Breyer, J.)
(“For those who find legislative history useful, the House Report’s account should end the matter. Others . . . may reach the same conclusion . . . .”).
260 See Mank, supra note 32, at 825-26 (noting that both Justices Thomas and Kennedy have
shown support for a textualist approach but that Kennedy has since moved from a pure textualist
model).
261 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 60-61 (1987) (noting that “the words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters,
are the ‘law’”).
262 Creswell, supra note 137, at 1003.
263 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1089.
264 See id. at 1090 (“Despite Justice Powell's objections to judicial policymaking, the Court
seemed to conclude that if it did not create an implied right of action it would fail to enforce the statute.”).
265 See Mank, supra note 32, at 826 (“Numerous commentators have criticized the textualist
method of statutory interpretation and argued that judges should examine extrinsic sources, such as
legislative history, as a means to reconstruct congressional intent or purposes in enacting a statutory
provision, especially if the textual terms are ambiguous.”) (internal quotations omitted).
266 Id. at 827.
267 See Scalia, supra note 209, at 32-34.
268 MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). The willingness to use dictionary definitions is not, however, confined to the textualist approach. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124
259
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proach, to some critics, appears to be just as arbitrary a way to determine
269
meaning as examination of intent. A third concern is that textualists must
inherently rely on canons of interpretation that tend, at times, to appear to
270
contradict each other. Legislative history, while imperfect, at least gives
more credence to what Congress intended rather than the choice of judicial
canon.
Commentators further argue that there is some indication that Con271
gress itself dislikes this judicial approach to the interpretation of statutes.
They point out that the evidence appears to show that cases decided by a
court employing textualist interpretation is more likely to be overturned by
Congress through statutory amendment than one made by courts using other
272
means of interpretation. Even if this criticism were true, it fails to make a
273
compelling argument against textualism. Congress may prefer and intend
for a court to interpret much into a statute (and therefore to use such things
as legislative intent). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress adjusted their
statutes to overrule what textualist decisions saw as wanting implicitly
meant that Congress moved to make their intent expressly known through
the new legislation, meeting exactly the concerns made by textualists by
clearly stating their intent in the text of the new statute.
The scholarly argument against Justice Scalia’s basic premises on interpretation has not changed his mind. Yet, even Justice Scalia would give
274
up on removing previously granted implied causes of action. Justice

S. Ct. 1836, 1845 n.15-16 (2004) (Stevens, J.) (citing the American Heritage Dictionary, Black’s Law
Dictionary, and the Oxford English Dictionary for definitions of statutory language).
269 Mank, supra note 32, at 828.
270 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). This theory, however, neglects the fact that significant anti-textualist jurists regularly employ these same tools. E.g., F. HoffmanLa Rouche Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (Breyer, J.) (relying on a rule of statutory construction to “assume
that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write
American laws”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1245 (2004) (Breyer, J.) (holding
that while the general canon of statutory construction is that identical words in different parts of the
same statute should convey the identical meaning, “the presumption is not rigid and readily yields
whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant
the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent”) (internal
quotations omitted).
271 Mank, supra note 32, at 828.
272 Id.; see also Musick, 508 U.S. at 293-94 (noting that Congress overruled the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lampf by taking away the holding’s retroactive effect).
273 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I believe, moreover, that Congress
would welcome the certainty that [eliminating implied causes of action] would produce. Surely conscientious legislators cannot relish the current situation, in which the existence or nonexistence of a private
right of action depends upon which of the opposing legislative forces may have guessed right as to the
implications the statute will be found to contain.”).
274 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279 (accepting that “it is clear from our decisions, from Congress’s
amendments of Title VI . . . [that] private individuals may sue to enforce Section 601 of Title VI and
obtain both injunctive relief and damages”). See generally Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., con-
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Scalia may be right on his criticisms and concerns. However, as any first
year law student learns, being right does not necessarily translate into being
followed by a majority. Thus, Justice Scalia’s approach must necessarily be
placed aside as an idea perhaps ahead of its time, temporarily replaced with
other ideas more in line with current Supreme Court approaches.
B. The Contextualist Response
One alternative approach to Justice Scalia’s view would be to take a
statute that is silent on causes of action and silent on its legislative history
and to ask whether Congress passed the statute in an era when the Supreme
Court implied causes of action with more frequency. This contextualist approach argues that it is necessary at times to interpret statutes based on legislative silence because most times that the statute is silent, the legislative
intent is similarly silent. Additionally, the Court has teasingly suggested this
approach on occasion, though it has never relied on it as a sole factor to the
chagrin of many scholars.
Contextualism appears to have grown upon Justice Stevens’s comment
that “[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives,
275
like other citizens, know the law.” Justice Stevens’ argument thus rests on
the premise that Congress, in knowing the state of Supreme Court law in all
areas and importantly, in the area of implied causes of action, must have
duly intended implication according to Supreme Court law for statutes
276
passed at that time to be implied.
This argument appears logical in that the Court should hold Congress
277
to a standard no less than that of the average citizen. It is, however, noth278
ing more than a constructive assumption. It rests on an assumption that
279
Congress acts with one united voice at all times throughout history. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said as much, noting that “[w]e shall assume
for the sake of argument (though we by no means accept) that Congress
curring) (noting that “if a change is to be made, we should get out of the business of implied private
rights of action altogether”).
275 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 379 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97).
276 See id.
277 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 757 (noting that “citizens must be presumed to know something
about the law if laws are to be applied consistently. Ignorance of the law, of course, is no excuse for a
failure to comply with the law, for a member of Congress any more than for an average citizen.”).
278 Id. at 757 (noting “it is not seriously contended that any person, or any member of Congress, is
actually aware of the full extent and detail of the laws to which he is subject”). This assumption also
contains another underlying assumption: that Congress, in passing the law, was not mistaken about the
law itself. Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) (holding that “the relevant inquiry is
not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the
state of the law was”).
279 The Supreme Court itself identified the weakness of this assumption. Johnson v. Trans. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (“When a court says to the legislature: ‘you (or your predecessor) meant
X,’ it almost invites the legislature to answer: ‘We did not.’”).
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must be presumed to have had . . . [a relatively obscure decision] in mind as
280
the backdrop to all its legislation.” The Supreme Court’s use of context
281
282
has therefore been haphazard at best and never as the sole rationale. In
all fairness to the intellectual community, even textualists at times engage in
283
contextual assumptions. Some have gone so far as to point out that even
284
Justice Scalia has engaged in a contextualist approach. This wishful
thinking does not appear to have resulted in Scalia’s support of contextual285
ism in general.
1.

Distinguishing Among Contextualists

To be fair, the contextualism in Curran and the contextualism argued
286
for by scholars appear to be somewhat distinct. The Curran contextualism, also seen in Cannon, involved the judicial interpretation of a statute or
287
a related statute prior to the one at issue in the case. The argument for this
form of contextualism runs that statutory language, having been previously
given certain meaning by the Supreme Court, should be given a similar
280 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); see also Morse v. Republican Party
of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 234 n.47 (1996) (holding that even though a more stringent implication approach
came into being before the statute was passed, the timing between the decision and the amendment was
not far enough for Congress to have been expected to apply it).
281 See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 296 n.7 (noting that while the respondent argued for legislative
context in interpreting a statute, “[w]e cannot assume from legislative silence on private rights of action,
that Congress anticipated that a general regulatory prohibition . . . would provide an automatic basis for
a private remedy in the nature of common-law nuisance”); see also Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 378
(“The key to these cases is our understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974 when it comprehensively
reexamined and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading.”).
282 Stabile, supra note 18, at 892.
283 See Mank, supra note 32, at 833 (“Justice Scalia assumes that the ‘whole Congress’s is composed of legislators that both use words based on their most common or ordinary usage, and that these
legislators are cognizant of related statutes and judicial decisions.”).
284 Nancy Eisenhauer, Comment, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Statutes: the Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1992) (“Justice Scalia carefully considered the
context of the statute’s enactment, and in fact used the current test only after determining that no test
existed during the time of the statute’s enactment.”).
285 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “context alone cannot suffice”).
286 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that context is relevant only in cases where “the judicial
interpretation of related legislation prior to the subject statute’s enactment or of the same legislation
prior to its reenactment, had been held to create private rights of action”).
287 See Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 379; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97 (noting that “[i]n
1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating
a private remedy” in other similar civil rights acts); Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1083 (holding that
implication cases where the Court has previously implied causes of action and Congress has not acted in
contravention raises the contextual analysis); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-73 (noting that the question of
whether an implied cause of action existed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was in
part based on the silence of Congress to judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Amendment of 1986); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting “we have held
context to be relevant to our determination in only two cases—both of which involved statutory language that, in the judicial interpretation of related legislation prior to the subject statute’s enactment, or
of the same legislation prior to its reenactment, had been held to create private rights of action”).
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reading when a similar statute or similar language is found in the case at
288
bar. To avoid confusion, this Comment will refer to this form of contextualism as “term of art” contextualism.
Scholars appear to take this to include a form of contextualism when
Congress passes a statute in light of the Court’s general interpretation of
289
implied causes of action, however. Thus, if a court today were to receive
a case in 2004 involving a statute passed in 1905 and found it necessary to
engage in a contextual analysis, it would look at the state of statutory law as
well as judicial interpretation of implied rights of action as it stood in
290
1905. Scholars call this form of contextualism the “acquiescence doc291
trine.” In its purest form, it would find intent to create a cause of action
292
through longstanding practice known to Congress.
It is unclear if the “acquiescence doctrine” necessarily follows from
“term of art” contextualism, though the Court has recently implied in dicta
293
that this is a reasonable approach. Additionally, as Justice Douglas
pointed out, “an error in interpreting a federal statute may be easily remedied. If this Court has failed to perceive the intention of Congress, or has
interpreted a statute in such a manner as to thwart the legislative purpose,
294
Congress may change [the statute].” Thus in most cases, the two forms of
288 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 593 n.14 (“Congress, with full awareness of how the agencies were
interpreting Title VI, has modeled later statutes on § 601 of Title VI, thus indicating approval of the
administrative definition.”).
289 E.g., Stabile, supra note 18, at 888-89 (noting as an example that ERISA, replacing common
law of trusts, would be subject to implication by the context of the common law on trusts).
290 See Mank, supra note 32, at 843 (pointing out that this form of contextualism addresses the
question of what to do when “a 1995 court is deciding whether to imply a private right of action for a
statute enacted in 1965”); Stabile, supra note 18, at 889-90 (noting that “if a 1995 court is deciding
whether to imply a cause of action from a statute enacted in 1933, that court must determine congressional intent based on how courts in 1933 viewed implication, and on the 1933 Congress’s understanding of how those courts viewed implication”). This is not unlike the approach demanded by Justice
Brennan. Jett, 491 U.S. at 742 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would make no sense, however, to apply
a test first enunciated in 1975 to a statute enacted in 1866.”).
291 Some would argue that this doctrine’s proper name is “Congressional Ratification Theory.”
Mank, supra note 32, at 861. However, this name has not curried favor on the Court. Cent. Bank, 511
U.S. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that “our observations on the acquiescence doctrine
indicate its limitations as an expression of congressional intent”). Additionally, scholars have accepted
the term as “acquiescence doctrine.” See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 206 (referencing this theory as “ . . .
the theory of legislative acquiescence . . . ”). Finally, ratification is defined as “approval; sanction;
confirmation.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1496 (Jean L. McKechnie ed.,
2d ed. 1983). Instead, a more correct name would be “congressional acquiescence theory” since Webster’s defines “acquiescence” as “a quiet assent…silent submission.” Id. at 18.
292 See Davant, supra note 50, at 634 (“That agencies for decades have promulgated regulations
that purport to confer individual rights on classes of plaintiffs, without interference or objection by
either Congress or the courts, is some evidence that agencies are acting in a manner that the Constitution
authorizes.”).
293 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181 (noting that the context of the act was an issue for the Court to
examine).
294 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 133-34 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Hilton
v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (pointing out that “considerations of stare decisis
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context would become indistinguishable after the Court has made its deter295
mination. The Supreme Court’s holdings have far from supported use of
296
either form of contextualism as a sole rationale. Holdings appear mixed,
however, as to whether context has value in the determination of congres297
sional intent.
Scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should deal with the
question of implication by legislative silence by looking at the context of
298
the statute’s passage. This rationale argues, “congressional silence in the
wake of the judicial construction of a statute indicates congressional ap299
proval of that judicial construction.” Some argue that context itself be300
came an additional factor added to the Cort analysis, although the Court

have special force in the area of statutory interpretation [because] unlike in the context of constitutional
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done”). Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978) (noting that “although we
have stated that stare decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication
because, in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes through legislation, we have never
applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning
of statutes”) (internal citations omitted).
295 In fact, the “term of art contextualist” would refuse to reinterpret the statute in a different way
unless the statutory language were changed to result in a different reading under then current Supreme
Court law while the “historical contextualist” would refuse to reinterpret the statute in a different way
unless Congress affirmatively acts to change the statute to reflect that it disagreed with the Court’s
decision. Under either approach, the contextualist would insist that the next move would belong to
Congress to change the statute.
296 E.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (noting that Cort itself involved interpretation of a statute
under a previous understanding and yet that did not prevent the court from interpreting the statute independent of context for intent); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176; Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 535 (1989) (relying in part on the fact that the judiciary had previously
played no role in allowing causes of action in this situation and therefore the historical context of the
statute did not constitute enough evidence to support a cause of action); see also Kaufman, supra note 4,
at 168-69 (stating that the Supreme Court has not accepted “acquiescence” as a valid basis for creation
of an implied right of action).
297 Compare Musick, 508 U.S. 286 (relying in part on the “acquiescence doctrine”) and General
Dynamic, 124 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (holding in part that “[t]he very strength of this consensus [of interpretation among the circuit courts] is enough to rule out any serious claim of ambiguity, and congressional
silence after years of judicial interpretation supports adherence to the traditional view”) with Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (“It does not follow . . . that Congress’s failure to
overturn a statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is impossible to assert with any
degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the
Court's statutory interpretation. Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage of a bill
which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congressional inaction cannot amend a
duly enacted statute.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Schuetz, supra note 92, at 426 (noting that
“while context alone will not suffice, it is not accurate to say that context is immaterial”).
298 E.g., Mank, supra note 32, at 829-44; Stabile, supra note 18, at 888-93; Boyer, supra note 19,
at 754-58; Eisenhauer, supra note 284, at 1192-207.
299 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 206.
300 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 756 (commenting that Merrill Lynch “made a unique contribution
to the development of the doctrine of implied rights of action” because “[u]ntil Merrill Lynch, the four
Cort factors were treated as exhaustive. In Merrill Lynch . . . Justice Stevens establish[ed] a new method
of raising a presumption of congressional intent . . . ”).
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301

has never held such an interpretation. Implication arguably works both
ways, existing to support an implied cause of action where the legislative
intent is silent or existing to deny an implied cause of action where the leg302
islative intent tends otherwise to support the implication. Notably, scholars more often invoke context arguing for an implied cause of action in
303
some statute rather than against.
2.

Contextualism: A Doubtful Method of Interpretation

Interpretation by context is one of the more dubious ways to discern
congressional intent imaginable. As a preliminary matter, it does not comport with an obvious analogy of how the Supreme Court itself interprets its
304
own past holdings. In addition, context requires that the Court in 2004
examine a statute passed in 1905 with an understanding of the state of the
305
law in 1905. Granting that some presumptions and legal fictions are necessarily required in a search for legislative intent when the congressional
306
history is devoid of such intent, this approach still seems far too problematic to be entertained as a legitimate way to interpret a statute. It is irrational to claim that the Supreme Court can easily find Congressional intent

301

Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 353.
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72 (holding that “the same contextual approach used to justify an implied
right of action more than amply demonstrates the lack of any legislative intent to abandon the traditional
presumption in favor of all available remedies”). Boyer, supra note 19, at 756. See generally Cent.
Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (holding that since Congress created express rights of action with certain limits,
“it would be . . . anomalous to impute to Congress an intention in effect to expand the defendant class
for [an implied cause of action] beyond the bounds delineated for comparable express causes of action”).
303 E.g., Boller, supra note 37, at 1326-27 (arguing that the context of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 lends itself towards an implied cause of action as it is a civil rights statute); Boyer, supra note 19,
at 758 (arguing that the context of the Brook Amendment of 1981 lends itself towards an implied cause
of action); Eisenhauer, supra note 284, at 1197-98 (arguing that the context of the Air Carriers Access
Act of 1986 lends itself towards an implied cause of action); Harner, supra note 92, at 930-31 (arguing
that the context of the United States Housing Act of 1937 lends itself towards an implied cause of action); Sagers, supra note 19, at 1389-90 (arguing that the context of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act lends itself towards an implied cause of action).
304 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285 n.5 (pointing out that while the majority opinion in a previous case
did not mention a position of the concurrence, the majority’s “holding is not made coextensive with the
concurrence because their opinion does not expressly preclude the concurrence's approach. The Court
would be in an odd predicament if a concurring minority of the Justices could force the majority to
address a point they found unnecessary (and did not wish) to address, under compulsion of Justice
Stevens’ new principle that silence implies agreement.”) (internal citations omitted).
305 Boyer, supra note 19. This, of course, requires an assumption that the Court must examine the
intent of Congress at the time of the passage. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (“Not even when interpreting
the same Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that was at issue in Borak have we applied Borak’s method
for discerning and defining causes of action.”).
306 Even legislative history filled with Congress’s views on the matter at hand might constitute a
legal fiction called “congressional intent.” See notes 210-33 and accompanying text.
302
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307

using context from as recent as the past 20 years. It would be almost
laughable to suggest that the Court is capable of properly interpreting the
congressional mood of 90 years ago. For too many implied causes of action,
308
the Court may have to do just that. This is not to say that implication
cases should require the Supreme Court to infer into a statute passed during
the Depression the intent of the current sitting Congress. Instead, the Court
should be highly wary of the use of contextual evidence altogether in that
case because of the inherent risk that the Court, examining legislative intent
from the only “context” humans can, from history and from experience,
might implicitly transfer the intent of the Congress it knows for the intent of
the Congress it does not know.
3.

Contextualism as a Creator of Yet More Separation Problems

As an additional note to the question of the validity of context, the use
of context itself may expose deep problems concerning separation of powers that may result in a general denial of the validity of the implication doc309
trine itself. An example of this is Sandoval. The Supreme Court, deciding
whether to lower the standard of proof in an implied cause of action under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered (though ultimately re310
jected) the views of the executive branch on the matter. Hence, in this
case it was possible that the Executive Branch in 2001 would be able to
interpret the Congressional intent of the Legislative Branch of 1964 and
311
explain that intent to the Judicial Branch of 2001. Regardless of the ability of the Executive to accomplish this feat of historic interpretation, one
would be foolish not to ask how much intent would be left of Congress after
both concurrent Branches have had their say on the matter. As one scholar
pointed out, “[s]uch an interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court

307 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181 (attempting and ultimately failing to find a cause of action in an
eight-year-old statute).
308 See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 547 n.16 (pointing out that “even if the 91st Congress had
believed that there was an implied right of action under § 17(a) . . . ” of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, it would not have mattered because the intent in question would be that of Congress in 1934); Va.
Bankshares, 501 U.S. 1083 (determining the viability of an implied cause of action for the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by the Court in 1991); see also Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1514 (noting that “an
especially fertile ground for implication is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . ”).
309 Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
310 Id. at 287-88.
311 Amicus Brief for United States at 14, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). However,
the Supreme Court did agree with the position of the Executive in other cases. E.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at
780 (agreeing with the Executive on the proper interpretation of the Portal-to-Portal Act); Merrill Lynch,
456 U.S. at 387 (agreeing with the Executive on whether a private cause of action existed in the Commodities Exchange Act).
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regarding private remedies . . . represents a startling judicial rejection of the
312
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.”
Finally, use of context to assume that Congress assented to the judicial
interpretation of the statute has the added difficulty of assuming congressional intent through congressional inaction. When Congress explicitly creates a cause of action, it also implicitly grants judicial authority to interpret
313
the statute. When the judiciary finds an implied cause of action, however,
it is difficult to justify an argument that a conscious “delegation” of congressional authority to add and adjust legislatively granted causes of action
314
has occurred. Rather, the Court, by using this approach to admit an implied cause of action may in fact be unconstitutionally expanding federal
315
judicial power to the detriment of Congress. Until Congress passes a statute setting forth a cause of action explicitly (or explicitly denying one), the
Legislative Branch has not made a deliberative act that can be interpreted as
316
a desire to deal with the matter.
C. A New Approach to the Congressional Intent Test
Finding Justice Scalia’s textualist approach impractical and the contextualist approach overly problematic, the resulting question must be how the
Supreme Court should interpret intent and how much intent must exist to
positively or negatively establish legislative intent. A fair balance of the
competing views would be for the Court to require some positive showing
of intent from congressional members before accepting a positive finding
under the legislative history factor of Cort. The Supreme Court should
adopt this standard for three reasons. First, such an approach would satisfy
Justice Powell’s concerns about separation of powers. Second, precedent
generally supports this method of inferring congressional intent. Finally,
several concurrent analogies already exist in Supreme Court doctrine to
justify this approach.
1. This Approach Satisfies Concerns of Separation of Powers
The first reason that the Supreme Court should require a positive
showing of congressional intent is because the original purpose of focusing
so much on the second factor was to give effect to legislative intent. Justice
312

Kaufman, supra note 4, at 221.
Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of
Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 108
(1997).
314 Id.
315 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 210 (“Even if Congress had acquiesced by its silence to the expansion of federal judicial power beyond that contemplated . . . the federal courts could not constitutionally
accept that power.”).
316 Fallone, supra note 313, at 108.
313
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Powell’s concerns about separation of powers would seemingly necessitate
317
actual congressional evidence. As Justice Powell wrote in Cannon, “we
should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal
statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended
318
such an action to exist.” For Justice Powell’s concerns to hold water, his
approach must be grounded in the position that it is not enough for compelling evidence from the history to show that Congress intended the cause of
action to occur. Instead, the Powell approach logically requires evidence in
the history that Congress actually intended the cause of action to exist. The
319
Supreme Court has somewhat followed Justice Powell’s approach.
Some form of “congressional speechmaking” or “floor debate” must
exist on the issue in the least. Summations made by staff or presumptions
made by the Court simply do not meet this burden. This helps to explain the
concern that even more practical and less philosophical Justices have had
320
with the Supreme Court’s change in direction in Thompson.
321
The Supreme Court, by adopting the contextualist view on occasion,
has moved away from this understanding by placing the presumptions about
the expected intent of Congress to be on equal or even greater footing than
322
that of concerns actually articulated by Congress. However, while the
Court has wisely never used that rationale as the sole justification for its
decision, it has left itself trapped into the position of potentially using this
approach in situations where congressional intent clearly brushes the other
way. Instead, the Court should stop engaging in this approach and insist that
the question of intent to create a cause of action should start with Congress,
323
not judicial interpretation of congressional silence.

317 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Court “should not
condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist”).
318 Id.
319 See Schuetze, supra note 92, at 429 (noting that “the Supreme Court does not wish to engage in
judicial legislation”). But see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-74 (holding that awarding of remedies for implied rights of action did not create separation of powers concerns and that “selective abdication of the
[ability of the judiciary to provide a remedy] would harm separation of powers principles in another
way, by giving judges the power to render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a
decision that no remedy is available”).
320 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
321 See notes 275-85 and accompanying text on contextualism.
322 See notes 231-32 and accompanying text on the actual intent of Congressman Baird.
323 See generally Zeigler, supra note 18, at 116 (pointing out that “if Congress wants a statute to
confer a right, create a cause of action, or provide a remedy, it must say so expressly, fully, and unambiguously. Moreover, the Court recently has made plain that if legislation is vague or incomplete, it is
Congress’s job to fix it, not the Court’s”).
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2. This Approach Comports with Supreme Court Precedent
An additional rationale for the court to require actual congressional intent before meeting the second factor, and ultimately the entire Cort analysis is that general Supreme Court precedent would be supportive of such a
324
move, not opposed. Both recent precedents as well as earlier decisions,
325
show this approach. Scholars have additionally noted that Supreme Court
precedent requires that Congress actively intend a cause of action and can326
not be indifferent or neutral on the matter. This would be in keeping with
the recent Supreme Court tendency to require clear statements from Congress when Congress has the constitutional right to act in any way it sees
327
fit.
What is meant here is not that the Court would vicariously overrule all
previous causes of action found. A Supreme Court decision requiring that
from now on Congress provide the Court with some indication of actual
intent on the issue would not overrule previous interpretations. Those interpretations would still be valid under the “acquiescence doctrine” of contex328
tualism. As mentioned above, this is a form of contextualism where the
Court assumes that Congress, having observed the Court interpret a statute
to mean a certain thing, and having refused to act to adjust the statute, im329
plicitly accepted that interpretation as correct. This theory would still be
viable as an explanation of congressional intent because its use would
pragmatically retain the essential implied causes of action that litigants have
330
traditionally relied upon.
324 E.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275; Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536 (“Had Congress intended the courts
to enforce a federal employees union’s duty of fair representation, we would expect to find some evidence of that intent in the statute or its legislative history.”). See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174 n.3 (relying
in part on statements made by Senators Durenberger and Wallop). But see Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at
1104 (noting that congressional silence is a serious obstacle, but it “is not, however, a necessarily insurmountable barrier”).
325 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 295-96
(finding no indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, and therefore finding no cause of action);
see also Kaufman supra note 4, at 205-06 (pointing out that “the Court has made it clear that the implication must be based on evidence of congressional intent”); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377-78 (“The
key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.”) (internal quotes omitted); see also Guardians, 463
U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that Title VI held clear legislative intent).
326 Stephen Grow, Note, Implying the Remedy of Corrective Disclosure Under the Williams Act,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 888 (1986) (“Congressional indifference or neutrality regarding an implied
cause of action is insufficient to justify continued judicial recognition of private rights of action.”).
327 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting that “the Court in the 1980s
has tended to create the strongest clear statement rules to confine Congress’s power in areas in which
Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything”).
328 Mank, supra note 32, at 861.
329 Id.
330 See Musick, 508 U.S. at 292 (“Having implied the underlying liability in the first place, to now
disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not addressed the issue would be
most unfair to those against whom damages are assessed.”). See generally Planned Parenthood of
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3. Analogies to the Actual Intent Standard
Four analogies generally support the position that the Supreme Court
should imply a cause of action only when the legislative history expressly
331
provides for one. The first analogy is sovereign immunity. The second
analogous situation is the Court’s treatment of Section 1983 cases. The third
analogous situation is the Court’s use of the doctrine of preemption. The
fourth analogous situation involves treaty abrogation by later enacted statutes. While the Court has never expressly required an affirmative showing
of congressional intent, analogous Supreme Court doctrines show that this
approach would not be out of keeping with Supreme Court jurisprudence.
a) Sovereign Immunity Requires Actual Intent. The first example by
analogy to a requirement that Congress itself manifest a clear statement to
the effect that it desires a cause of action has been that of statutes which
allege to remove sovereign immunity from the states or the federal govern332
ment. In this situation, the Supreme Court requires a specific mandate
from Congress to override the traditional presumption in favor of sovereign
333
immunity to the states, at least where Congress invokes its traditionally
334
exercised powers such as the Commerce Clause. While the rationales for
this approach are somewhat distinct from those of implied causes of ac335
336
tion, the overriding goals in both result in strikingly similar ends. It is
an entirely unremarkable thing to ask the Supreme Court to insist on express congressional intent through someone from Congress actually voicing

Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that the reliance by the public on the interpretation of the Court is a valid reason to be cautious in the Court’s decision on whether to overrule a previous decision).
331 Use of analogy when determining implied causes of action is not rare. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at
356 (holding that borrowing of a federal statute of limitations for federal implied causes of action are
effective “only ‘when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than [found
elsewhere] . . .’ ”).
332 E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
333 Tenn. v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004) (holding that the threshold question in determining
whether Congress has abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, is “whether Congress
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity . . . ”).
334 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (noting that “inasmuch as this Court . . . has left primarily to the
political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise”); Lane v. Pena, 518
U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A statute's legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly
in any statutory text; ‘the unequivocal expression of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist
upon is an expression in statutory text.’”).
335 Defenders of the clear statement doctrine for sovereign immunity have traditionally articulated
the requirement as a protection of the States’ Tenth and Eleventh Amendment powers. See Willscher,
supra note 124, at 268.
336 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 469 (noting that “it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of
Congress’s intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance”).
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his concern on the issue. Such a requirement is common in other doctrines
involving the interpretation of statutes passed by the Legislative Branch.
b) Denial of Section 1983 Requires Explicit Congressional Action.
The second analogous situation is that of the famous civil rights statute,
337
Section 1983. This statute, which allows for a cause of action for any
person who, under color of state action, is deprived of rights granted by the
338
“Constitution and laws,” has been confused at times with the analysis of
implied causes of action because of the similar analysis is entitled to a
339
cause of action. It remains clear, however, that sharp distinctions remain
between the use of Section 1983 and implied rights of action, such as the
fact that Section 1983 is, by statute, limited to federal statutory violations
340
by state actors or those loosely tied to the State and therefore less separa341
tion of powers concerns abound.
While there may be limitations on the uses of Section 1983, the Supreme Court has seemingly taken the issue of Section 1983 and allowed a
cause of action under any federal statute for a violation if that statute
granted a class of citizens some right unless Congress expressly or impli342
edly denied Section 1983 in the violated statute. This is different from an
implied cause of action where the Court will assume that the statute does
not grant a cause of action unless the Court finds Congressional intent to
343
grant that cause of action. Additionally, both approaches examine the
344
federal statute to see if it grants rights. It is unclear to what extent more
345
recent cases have limited or adjusted this analysis, but it is clear that the
analyses are sufficiently similar that it would not be surprising if scholars

337

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
The relevant text of the statute reads:
Every person who, under the color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
339 Jett, 491 U.S. at 712-13 (disputing Justice Brennan’s notion that a § 1983 cause of action
should be examined through a Cort analysis); see also Harner, supra note 92, at 937 (noting that “the
standards for section 1983 enforcement and the implication of private rights of action are sufficiently
similar to have produced substantial scholarly criticism and considerable confusion in the lower federal
courts”).
340 Stabile, supra note 18, at 872 (noting that “the only difference is in who has committed the
statutory violation”); see also Harner, supra note 92, at 937.
341 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9.
342 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
343 Harner, supra note 92, at 937.
344 Id.
345 Boyer, supra note 19, at 763 (arguing that two later cases made the 1983 inquiry coextensive
with the Court’s implied rights analysis).
338
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346

and courts occasionally combined the two. It is therefore not an unheard
of criticism that the Supreme Court itself has occasionally confused this
347
very issue. Scholars have pointed out that the wise plaintiff’s lawyer, if
forced to engage in either an implied cause of action theory or a Section
348
1983 theory as a primary claim, would do well to argue both.
Logically, Section 1983 causes of action and implied causes of action
are sufficiently analogous; some would say flip sides of the same coin.
Hence, it is notable that when a Section 1983 cause of action is contested
based on legislative intent, the Supreme Court generally requires that the
349
intent to deny a cause of action to be made clearly and expressly. It seems
consistent, therefore, that the implication doctrine equally and oppositely
350
requires that Congress clearly state its intent to create a cause of action.
Implication cases involve a textualist argument that the plain meaning of
351
the statute should be read against the implied cause of action. In a similar
vein, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the term “laws” in section 1983 should be read plainly to include all statutes passed by Con352
gress.
c) Preemption also Requires Actual Intent. The third analogous
situation to the proposed congressional intent doctrine is the preemption
doctrine. Preemption generally requires actual congressional intent in the
federal statute for the statute to wholly occupy an area of law traditionally
353
relegated to state law. This is because a statute that preempts state law on
the issue leads to a situation where Congress appears to have stricken the
state laws on the issue. The result is an individual left with recourse under
federal law or no remedy at all. The idea that preemption of state law requires actual congressional intent on the issue is similar to the implication
doctrine offered which equally requires actual Congressional intent that
346 Davant, supra note 50, at 626 (“Although the Sandoval Court’s holding is limited to a particular kind of federal right—limited rights of action—its reasoning and language could have broader implications.”).
347 As an example, Donald H. Zeigler argues that the Court did just that: “In the guise of deciding
whether the statute conferred a right and whether the private remedy the plaintiff sought was foreclosed
by a comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court essentially performed a Cort v. Ash analysis.” Zeigler,
supra note 18, at 112; see also Key, supra note 19, at 330-32 (accord).
348 See id. at 302.
349 Harner, supra note 92, at 938.
350 One could make the argument that the rationale for allowance of causes of action under section
1983 and denial under the theory of implication is a result of the fact that section 1983 cases in the least
have a federal statute upon which the ultimate cause of action can claim some justification against issues
of separation of powers; however, such claims and criticisms are beyond the scope of this Comment.
351 See note 273 and accompanying text for arguments based on textualism.
352 Key, supra note 19, at 308 (noting that the textualist theory is the most plausible of the alternative theories on the meaning of the term “law”).
353 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct.
2488, 2495-96 (2004).
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Congress expected a cause of action to exist under the statute. As the Court
noted in Kerr-McGee, legislative silence “takes on added significance in
light of Congress’s failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal
354
conduct.”
It should be therefore equally difficult to believe that Congress, without comment, would expect a statute to contain a cause of action without
any explanation as to the breadth or depth of that potential litigation. Thus
in preemption cases, the Supreme Court insists that Congress itself show a
clear statement to the effect that it wishes to engage in questions of federal355
ism by taking some issue away from state control. The Court should
similarly require actual congressional intent before the Court attempts to
engage in questions of separation of powers. The Court should require
Congress to expand the judicial power through a showing of clear intent to
grant a federal cause of action.
d) Certain Treaties Mandate Actual Congressional Intent to Overturn. The fourth analogous situation to the proposed actual congressional
intent standard is that of the requirement of clear evidence that Congress
intended to abrogate a treaty with an Indian tribe. Here the Supreme Court
requires that “there must be clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating
356
the treaty.” Instead, the Court requires that Congress consider the issue
and will not disregard the treaty if the statute abrogates treaty rights in “a
357
backhanded way.”
The rationale (though not the test) is unique amongst constitutional
358
doctrines. Yet it remains clear that the Supreme Court in these cases requires a clear intent from Congress before it will allow the congressionally
approved action to occur. This is the same test offered here towards implication cases: the Court will insist on a clear statement from Congress before
implying into the statute that a cause of action should exist.
D. The Actual Congressional Intent Requirement in Action
A final question naturally exists. Assuming that implication requires
some form of actual legislative intent, the question becomes how much
354
355

Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
In Silkwood, the issue to be removed from state control was that of nuclear maintenance. Id. at

251.
356
357
358

Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).
Id. (noting that “Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside”).
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actual intent needs to be established before the Court can legitimately find a
private remedy. A calibrated answer to this question can exist only if one
contemplates the stages or phases of potential legislative intent to determine
the cut-off.
1. Traditional Notions of Statutory Construction
359

The easy case is when the statute itself contains a cause of action.
The Supreme Court can find intent in such a case by examination of the
360
statutory language. When Congress legislates a cause of action into exis361
362
tence, or specifically legislates that a cause of action shall not exist, it
works with the Court to maintain easy distinctions of separation of pow363
ers.
More difficult is when the statute contains an administrative remedy or
364
other causes of action but no private cause of action on point. On this, the
359 Contu, 450 U.S. at 770 (stating that “. . . on its face, the Act is a minimum wage law . . . ”). Cf
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 361 (holding that the statute, by specifically refusing to limit individuals bringing an
implied cause of action in any way, expressed an intent to allow for broader implied causes of action).
360 Suter, 503 U.S, at 358 (holding that “the terms of [the statute] are clear . . . ”).
361 E.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 907(h) (1927) (“The
employer shall, however, have a cause of action against such third party . . . ”); 50 USCS § 1810 (1978)
(“An aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance . . . violation of section
109 . . . shall have a cause of action against any person who committed such violation . . . .”); 50 USCS
§ 1828 (1978) (“An aggrieved person . . . whose premises, property, information, or material has been
subjected to a physical search . . . in violation of section 307 . . . shall have a cause of action against any
person who committed such violation . . . .”).
362 E.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 2511 (2)(B) (1968) (“No cause of action shall lie in any court against any
provider of wire or electronic communication service . . . for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or certification under this
chapter . . . .”); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703 (e) (1986) (stating that no cause of action shall lie “against a provider disclosing information under this chapter.”); 42 U.S.C.S. § 9604 (j) (1980) (“There shall be no
cause of action to compel the President to acquire any interest in real property under this Act.”); see also
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 (finding that the statutes did not expressly create a right of action).
The art of express congressional denial has not been lost. Congress displayed its ability to limit certain
implied rights of action even while creating the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C.S § 236 (f) (2003)
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or authorize a private right of action to challenge a
decision of a consular officer or other United States official or employee to grant or deny a visa.”).
363 See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (deciding that “as with any case involving the interpretation of a statute, our analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself”); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S.
at 174 (accord); Kaufman, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing “when Congress legislates in favor of a class of
private plaintiffs seeking relief . . . the Supreme Court ensures the wall of separation of powers remains
‘high’”).
364 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569-71 (holding that the statute created an administrative remedy in the Securities and Exchange Commission and therefore did not also create a private remedy);
Guardians, 463 U.S. 582 (holding that the statute creating an administrative remedy to a Title VI Civil
Rights violation precluded a private right of action); Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 531-32 (holding that the
statute, by expressly leaving enforcement to the administrative agency, therefore denied a private cause
of action); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (stating that the statute’s “express means of enforcement”—i.e.,
agencies—precluded the notion that a private enforcement action was contemplated; see also Lampf,
501 U.S. at 359 (“When, the statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the
inquiry usually should be at an end.”).
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Supreme Court has generally held that inclusion of the alternative remedies
365
necessarily excludes congressional intent to provide a private remedy. At
least part of the reason for this approach is the maxim: “expressio unius est
366
367
exclusio alterius,” although this has not been the explicit rationale.
Further on this line, however, the Court has noted that if the administrative
remedy is insufficient based on agency refusal to enforce the law or agency
inability based on insufficient funds to enforce the law, the question of intent can be found if other indications of intent can be found to support im368
plication.
This line appears to be illogical if the true concern of the Court is
whether intent really exists. It would be nonsensical to tie the amount of
money allocated in the federal budget to an agency to the determination of
369
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. After all, if
370
the agency is under-funded or simply refuses to engage in enforcement,
the problem is not with congressional intent on whether private enforcement should occur, but rather with Congress itself for failing either to provide adequate funds for enforcement of required actions or to force the
agency to enforce the law nevertheless.
When Congress passes a statute with language previously used as a
371
term of art by the Supreme Court, congressional intent may appear sim372
ply by looking at the statute. This is because Congress, by using language

365 T.I.M.E. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (noting that the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
granted rate regulation of motor carriers exclusively to the Interstate Commerce Commission as providing a statutory scheme in which courts have no right to adjudicate such an issue). But see Merrill Lynch,
456 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the inclusion of a regulatory remedy did not necessarily exclude judicial remedies since both went to the goal of self-regulation); see also Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204,
1212 (2004) (holding that the statutory minimum of $1,000 in damages found in the Privacy Act of 1974
precluded recovery when physical damages were less than the statutory minimum).
366 “The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed.”
Stow v. Summit County, 590 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Ohio 3d Cir. 1990).
367 Sagers, supra note 19, at 1391. While not explicitly held, the Supreme Court has, on occasion,
all but accepted this rationale. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533 (holding that “it is also an ‘elemental canon’
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially
reluctant to provide additional remedies”).
368 See generally Boyer, supra note 19, at 743 (“When a court finds that a remedial scheme is
poorly defined and inadequate to address the needs of a plaintiff, contradictory conclusions regarding
congressional intent can be drawn from a silence that is at best ambiguous.”).
369 But see Stabile, supra note 18, at 883 (arguing that agencies generally have lump sum budgets
and little congressional direction on which statute to enforce with the most vigor).
370 Sagers, supra note 19, at 1398 (arguing for an implied cause of action for the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act in part because the agency to which its enforcement was entrusted, HUD,
“apparently has no interest in enforcing section 10”).
371 See supra note 287 and accompanying text on term of art contextualism.
372 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. 182 (relying in part on context); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (holding that “[t]he statute was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and therefore should
be treated the same way). Cf. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 534 (holding that “there exists no equivalent to
[the statute] which permits judicial enforcement of [a private cause of action]”).
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already given a certain meaning by the Court, arguably was justified to ex373
pect that the language would have a similar interpretation.
Similar to this logic, a statute that is amended by Congress that pro374
vides for more favorable language should be perceived as creating the
375
necessary intent to be interpreted under the second Cort factor. The Supreme Court has not consistently stated whether this would constitute ade376
quate intent. This situation constitutes valid indication of intent nonetheless because by amending the statute to be more amenable to implication
377
concerns, Congress implicitly intended that cause of action to exist. Such
logic would not extend to interpreting a form of congressional intent into a
378
statute where Congress chose not to amend the statute.
2.

Using Actual Intent

If the statute itself is silent and lends no direct inference on intent, how
much intent should the Supreme Court require in the history of the legisla379
tion? As the Supreme Court in Touche Ross pointed out, “implying a pri373 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (noting that between 1964 and 1972, federal courts and the Supreme
Court consistently found implied causes of action in similar situations as the one at issue).
This is not to be confused with the contextualist view on interpretation as the contextualist approach argues not that the language is given the value of a term of art, but rather that the language, given
a certain interpretation, is left untouched by later Congresses. See notes 269-79 and accompanying text
on contextualism.
374 For instance, an amendment that adds language providing a class certain rights or providing a
congressional purpose to remedy some violation of the statute. A similar result exists when a proposed
statute is amended in committee to more directly address legislative intent. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751
(pointing out that an early House Committee draft of a statute that was “. . . then revised, at the suggestion of the Attorney General . . . codified Congress’s unwilling[ness] to subject the United States to
liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power”) (internal quotations omitted).
375 E.g., Merrill Lynch, 353 U.S. at 384 (relying in part on a 1974 congressional amendment designed to strengthen regulation of futures trading). Daily, 464 U.S. at 537-38 (relying in part on amendments passed by Congress to a statute while also relying on the rejection of Congress of other amendments to the statute which would allow an investment company to bring an implied cause of action);
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816-17 (holding that Congress passed amendments to
the statute that “appeared to endorse” the implied cause of action). See generally Carlson, 446 U.S. at
19-20 (relying in part on congressional comments accompanying an amendment). C.f. Contu, 450 U.S.
at 775-76 (noting the legislative history of an amendment to the statute creating an administrative right
in lieu of a private right of action).
376 See Stabile, supra note 18, at 892 (“The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its acceptance of this theory of adoption, or acquiescence, by silence.”).
377 See Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1844 (holding that “Congress routinely creates new rights of action by
amending existing statutes, and altering statutory definitions or adding new definitions of terms previously undefined, as a common way of amending statutes”). This is not quite the same as “term of art
contextualism,” however, as the improving language still requires an affirmative act by Congress to
create the cause of action. Simply put, not just any amendment will do to create the requisite intent.
378 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 187 (holding that “[the Court has] stated, however, that failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute”)
(internal citations omitted).
379 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 (finding the legislative history of the statute “entirely silent
on the question of whether a private right of action for damages should or should not be available . . . ”).
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vate right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous en380
terprise, at best.” This is because “Congress, for reasons of its own, all
too frequently elects to remain silent on the private right-of action ques381
tion.” As a result, when the Supreme Court begins the questionable process of implying a cause of action in the face of congressional silence, the
Court inevitably multiplies the problem by attempting to interpret congressional intent on additional issues such as the appropriate statute of limitations that Congress intended to give that implied action when it is unclear
that Congress ever even expected the underlying action to exist in the first
382
place. This is exactly the purpose of what this Comment calls the “actual
intent” standard. Under this standard, the Court’s examination of intent begins and ends with a question of whether Congress actually considered the
issue of whether a cause of action should exist. This is arguably both a more
and less stringent standard than the one currently used. The forms of potential legislative intent show how the Court would decide under this new proposed standard.
The first situation is where Congressional debates occurred on the
383
floor of both Houses passing the statute. In this situation, the statute
would clearly meet the actual intent standard. Logically, a single Member
of each House on the respective congressional floors could raise the issue.
This is because that single Member, by raising the issue, arguably made
384
Congress aware of the possibility of implication in that case.
Less clear is the scenario where the debate occurs on the floor of only
385
one House of Congress. This has been enough in some circumstances.
While this approach is less direct, the Supreme Court should find Congressional intent in this situation. The statute’s history, having been subjected to
debate on this issue in at least one House, means that legislators have con380 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571. But see Musick, 508 U.S. at 295 (“Inquiring about what a given
Congress might have done, though not a promising venture as a general proposition, does in this case
yield an answer we find convincing.”).
381 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608.
382 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359.
383 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 n.11 (relying in part on both House and Senate records of
floor debates).
384 But see Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1248 (holding that “even the contemporaneous remarks
of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history”) (internal
quotations omitted).
It should be noted that the question of whether the Congressional member who brought up the possibility ultimately voted for the statute should be immaterial for similar reasons.
385 See, e.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at 774 (relying on a speech by Representative Bacon in examining
congressional intent); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182 n.3 (relying in part on statements of Senators Durenberger and Wallop in examining congressional intent); see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 20-21 (declining
to find enough congressional intent in a statute where “Senator Stafford stated on the Senate floor that . .
. [the law was designed to grant a protection of rights because the Senator] . . . spoke merely in terms of
‘assisting’ the States”); see also id. at 21 (relying in part on Senators Randolph’s and Javits’s position as
to whether the statute created a private cause of action or merely acted as an assistance program).
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sidered the issue and an intent has formed on the issue by ultimately passing the law. While some would criticize this approach based on concerns of
386
bi-cameralism, what the Court would be doing here is less like a single
House veto, and more like a single House addition, without which the statute would arguably not have been passed in at least one House and therefore never passed into law.
A third relatively clear scenario is when congressional members in the
committee from which the bill came voice their opinions during committee
387
meetings. This refers specifically to speeches, comments, and concerns
made by members of Congress while in committee debating and deciding
388
the merits of the proposed legislation. This is yet a more difficult case to
discern legislative intent from because the entire House of one House is
simply not present when the committee raised these concerns. However,
under the proposed standard of actual intent, committee members’ views
should count towards legislative intent for purposes of Cort.
The reason for this is twofold. First, because a congressional member
brought the issue up it would simply be consistent to count this intent as
389
actual legislative intent. Indeed, if the intent of a Congressional member
does not count towards actual legislative intent, then the entire enterprise is
arguably a misnomer. Second, congressional members generally self-select
themselves to sit on various committees. They do so for a variety of reasons, from political gain to expertise on a particular area. It cannot and
should not be the position of the Supreme Court, however, to discount the
concerns of a Congressman because they chose to sit on a committee on
which they may have particularized knowledge of the subject matter. The
Court rather should give equal weight to committee members’ views because of their insight on how the best and brightest of Congress on the issue
believed that the issue should be decided.
Another potential situation would be that of spoken congressional
390
member’s thoughts on an unpassed version of the same Act. Under this
situation, the expressed concerns of the congressional member should count
as evidence towards legislative intent, but weighed less heavily than other
forms of intent. Legislative intent admittedly exists. The actual statute,

386

See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (Court overruling a statute premised on a single house veto).
E.g., Merrill Lynch, 353 U.S. at 383 n.71 (relying in part on Representative Thorn’s comments); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 574 n.15 (relying in part on Senator Fletcher’s comments).
388 See id. at 571 n.11 (relying in part on the record of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee).
389 See generally Thompson, 484 U.S. at 518 n.3 (relying on the statements of Senators Durenberger and Wallop in committee).
390 E.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 600 (relying in part on the unsuccessful attempt to amend Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ease private rights of action); see also Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183-85
(noting the congressional debate between two competing legislative proposals and finding that the
rejection of one of them led to insight into the congressional intent of the other).
387
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however, can rebut that intent if that statute has changed in some way. Thus,
the intent of the Congress may have remained unexpressed overtly by the
new statute, yet the Supreme Court may find congressional intent by an
391
examination of Congress’s concerns about the previous statute.
Other forms of potential congressional intent would simply not be
enough. For example, legislative history offered after passage of the act is
392
simply invalid. This is because the act, once passed by Congress and
signed by the President, must stand or fall based on the language and intent
expressly creating it. If a Congress in the future could create a legislative
past, the process of passing statutes would amount to a system where the
law means simply what the majority of the present Congress thinks it
393
means. The Supreme Court therefore must give post-act legislative history little, if any, weight in the consideration of the second Cort factor.
394
Similar to this is legislative history in other, similar acts. While
some critics would argue that under this proposed standard of actual intent,
the Supreme Court should give that history similar weight to that of the
intent of similar but unpassed statutes, this would be an incorrect method of
discerning actual legislative intent. There would be two reasons that this
approach would be invalid. First, the legislative history of a passed statute
is logically different from that of the history of an unpassed statute in that
the history generally must remain close to the passed legislation. It is difficult enough for the legislative history of a passed statute to explain the intent of that statute, let alone the intent of other laws in the federal code.
Second, the Supreme Court itself has generally rejected this method of in395
terpretation as being too indecisive. The question of whether to carry
over the intent behind a similar statute to the statute at issue should be answered in the negative under the idea of “actual legislative intent.”
A comparable result should occur when the Supreme Court examines
396
the legislative history of evidence provided in the committee. When a
391 The question of whether a great mass of such concerns would be enough to overcome some
other more weighted form of legislative intent is beyond the scope of this Comment, however, and is too
remote to merit much concern.
392 Contu, 450 U.S. at 778 (holding that “the views of this later Congress [cannot] be treated as
determinative of the question whether the Act’s drafters intended to preclude [a private right of action]”).
393 See Scalia, supra note 209, at 22 (disputing the notion that “the law means what it ought to
mean”).
394 See Chao, 124 S. Ct. at 1212 (holding that “subsequent legislative history [found in a different
statute] will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language
and legislative history prior to its enactment”).
395 Lambert, supra note 92, at 1239.
396 E.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182 (examining the testimony of Acting Deputy Attorney General
Michel and a letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to Representative Peter Rodino in
interpreting whether the statute creates an implied cause of action); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 574 n.15
(examining the testimony of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency).
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congressional committee decides whether a bill should go before the floor,
the committee usually receives testimony as well as other forms of evidence
397
by citizens and specialists on the issue. While commendable that Congress examines this extraneous information before making its decision, the
Supreme Court should deny this the force of congressional intent. One reason is that evidence taken by committee may conflict and therefore create
inconsistency in use of some evidence for purposes of congressional in398
tent. Another reason is that under the proposed standard of “actual intent,” this information is simply not the expressed views of Congress or its
members on the issue.
On first impression, this may appear similar to that of the presumption
made previously that a single member of Congress’s views should count
towards legislative intent. Examined more carefully, however, this approach
neglects the fact that this situation requires a triple presumption. The first
presumption is that the committee receiving the evidence can constitute
Congressional intent. The second presumption is that the committee received entirely consistent evidence which was uncontradicted through the
hearing. The third presumption must suppose that the committee, upon receiving the evidence, ultimately had that evidence in mind when making
their recommendation. While one presumption may ultimately be helpful,
multiple presumptions obviously become problematic.
The final potential source of legislative history is that of the narratives
399
of the committee report. Under the proposed system of “actual legislative
intent,” this source is inherently flawed and should receive no value in discerning the second Cort factor. The reason for this is that it is unclear that
Congress itself, or even the congressional committee that created the report,

397 E.g., Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 383 (relying on the testimony of the Commodities Exchange
representatives given to the House Committee on Agriculture in concluding that Congress intended a
private right of action to exist); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181-82 (relying heavily on the testimony of
Acting Deputy Attorney General Michel). Some cases have gone even further than testimony. Daily, 464
U.S. at 537 (relying in part on a report commissioned by the SEC to hold that Congress intended a right
of action).
398 Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 n.16 (showing a disagreement between the majority and dissent as to
whether certain “evidence” taken by the congressional committee on whether to pass the Americans
with Disabilities Act was valid evidence regarding state abuses or immaterial evidence addressing nonstate actors).
399 See Contu, 450 U.S. at 773-74 (relying in part on the House Committee on Education and
Labor Report of the statute); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 20 (relying in part on the House Committee report
to find no cause of action); Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1844 (using a House Report to determine “that Congress
was keenly aware of the problems associated with the [Court’s approach in determining federal statutes
of limitations]”); F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 2369 (holding that the legislative history and
reports of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act “suggest that Congress designed to clarify,
perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign
commerce”). See generally Suter, 503 U.S. at 361 n.15 (finding legislative history found in the Report
of the Senate Committee on Finance “relevant” to the inquiry of whether Congress intended a cause of
action to exist).
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400

has read or even thought about the contents of the report. This is because
of a related concern, namely that congressional Members never write the
401
committee reports. Instead, congressional staffers or lobbyists tradition402
ally accomplish this task. Under the proposed system of actual legislative
intent, the Supreme Court should deny this non-congressional attempt at
creating a legislative history to discern that Congress impliedly intended to
create a cause of action.
The result in this situation is admittedly similar to that of Justice
403
Scalia’s distaste for committee reports. Nevertheless, if the committee
report contains strictly the speeches and debates of congressional members
and is devoid of narrative, the reports may have some evidentiary weight in
determining congressional intent under the proposed standard.
After examining all potential sources of congressional intent that could
arguably result in a finding under the second Cort factor, it is important to
note what should not play a role in that determination, namely the concern
404
for floodgates. Admittedly, members on the Supreme Court have on occasion considered the issue of floodgates as a concern that merits attention
405
406
for purposes of implication. Scholars have voiced concerns as well.
However, the Court should not base its decision on whether a cause of action would result in more litigation for three reasons.
The first reason is that the question of implication is a jurisdictional issue. Implication cases require the court to consider whether the cause of
action exists under the statute in which the Court grants subject matter ju407
risdiction. Thus, implication cases should not create the kind of floodgate
concerns many worry about because whether to imply a cause of action,

400

See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text on committee reports.
Scalia, supra note 209, at 35.
402 Id.
403 Id.
404 See generally Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 377 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 315 (1996): “[t]oday’s caseloads make it a question of some moment whether judges
legitimately may consider caseload effects when deciding a case”).
405 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377 (“The increased complexity of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of
legislative intent than Rigsby had required.”); see also Lampf, 501 U.S. at 369 (arguing that “judicial
economy” argued for a shorter statute of limitations for the implied cause of action); Vaca, supra note
143, at 474-75 (“Undoubtedly, an important motivating factor in the Supreme Court’s expansion of [a
federal arbitration statute] has been the Court’s attempt to reduce the case load on an overburdened
federal court system.”).
406 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 138-41 (noting that “if federal courts may abstain entirely from
hearing actions that Congress has explicitly directed them to hear, surely they may decline for pragmatic
reasons to hear lawsuits that Congress has not explicitly authorized”) (internal footnotes omitted). But
see Stern, supra note 403, at 378 (arguing that “in almost all situations, the fear of increased litigation is
not a valid judicial argument”).
407 See supra note 4 on jurisdictional issues involving implication cases.
401
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even if it must go to the Supreme Court, ultimately is decided before full
408
litigation and discovery. The second reason that the Court should not
409
worry about this issue is that this has not been a concern as of yet, nor
does it logically follow that the creation of a host of implied causes of action itself would result in a vast increase in cases brought to the federal
410
courts. As Justice Powell noted in Cannon, the Supreme Court, since
Cort has seemingly implied enough causes of action for most of the major
411
pieces of legislation to have at least one cause of action in federal court.
This does not even count the implied causes of action made by the Supreme
412
Court since Cannon. A third reason for the Court to ignore the question
of floodgates is that it would remove attention from the more important

408 Some additionally note that implied causes of action are generally brought along with other
claims and therefore the dismissal of the implication claim would not appreciably decrease the federal
workload. Sagers, supra note 19, at 1402-03. This theory, however, seems to conflict with the idea that
implication cases are needed in order to ensure that the plaintiff receive some remedy at all.
409 Boyer, supra note 19, at 747 (explaining “if in fact the Court’s design is to limit the amount of
litigation imposed on the already overburdened federal courts by enforcing only those remedies explicitly provided for by Congress, the continued profession of Cort’s vitality can only encourage protracted
lawsuits by plaintiffs destined ultimately to be denied relief”).
410 See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 189-90 (pointing out that while an average of 2,358.5 securities
and commodities actions where filed over a three year period, only an average of 123.5 were implication
cases). This is far more striking when it is considered that over 283,688 cases went before federal district courts in a comparable year. Stern, supra note 400, at 386.
411 At the time of Cannon, the implication of as many as 15 different federal statutes had already
occurred by the courts. Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action in section 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action from section 1007(a)
of Federal Aviation Act of 1958); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (implying a cause of action from Section 203 of National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958);
Riggle v. Cal., 577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action under the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act); Davis v. Southeastern Cmty. Coll., 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause
of action under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action under Art. 28(1) of Warsaw Convention); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under Section 206 of Investment Advisors Act of 1940; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 568
F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 11(e) of Fed. Home Loan Bank Act);
N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under Sections 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall Act); Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977)
(implying a cause of action under Section 17(a) of securities Act of 1933); United Handicapped Fed’n v.
Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act
of 1973); Nedd v. U.S. Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under
section 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 1947); Kipperman v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d 377
(9th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under 39 U. S. C. 3009); McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago &
Argonne, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 1 of Davis-Bacon Act),
Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1976) (implying a cause of action under
section 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Two implication cases during that time involved the federal Court of Appeals finding a cause of action only to be overturned by the Supreme Court: Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Transamerica, 444 U.S.
11.
412 See appendix.
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concern, namely congressional intent behind the statute. Instead, an examination of floodgates would remove from the Court the one concern that
creates the purpose of the examination of legislative intent, namely that of
414
deference to Congressional choice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the implication doctrine has undergone radical change
from its common law ancestry. It has moved from towards a factorial approach and soon after to an approach which focuses on congressional intent.
Nevertheless, while the rationale for implications has changed over the
years, the question of how to interpret has remained elusive and lacking
definition.
It is hoped that this Comment has helped both to explain how the Supreme Court has performed in the past and how it might improve on its
performance of the role of interpretive partner to Congress in the constitutional order. Other doctrines exist to clarify and adjust the current implication doctrine, however, they remain impractical and provide more constitutional problems than they appear to solve. A new approach that asks for an
adoption of an actual intent standard, where the Supreme Court insists upon
actual intent from Congress, would be in keeping with other doctrines, current precedent, as well as consistent throughout the many potential forms of
congressional intent.

413 See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Supreme Court’s
decision to deny extension of an implied cause of action would result in overruling “hundreds of judicial
and administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system . . . ”); see also Stern, supra note
403, at 395 (arguing that the concern of floodgates “. . . is simply not considered in the Constitution and
thus ruling on its basis should not be assumed to effectuate the purpose of the judiciary as delineated in
Article III. As such, doing so violates the Constitution’s separation of powers”).
414 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (pointing out that because it is better
for Congress to specify its intentions, “for this very reason this Court in the future should be extremely
reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch”).
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